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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN URBAN 
CHINA: A CASE STUDY OF NANJING 
 
In the recent years, cities have emerged as the primary loci of interest in debates over 
issues on environmental governance. This thesis seeks to problematize the notion of 
environmental governance and ecological modernity in urban China from three 
dimensions. The first dimension is from a top-down environmental governance 
approach by the state, the second perspective is from bottom-up approach to 
environmental governance by the civil society, and finally the third looks at urban 
ecological planning as a form of environmental governance. In this thesis, the 
empirical analysis of Nanjing illustrates some difficulties faced by cities in urban 
China in carrying out environmental governance, including that of contested 
environmental governance regimes and limited citizen participation. In addition, it 
also examines two main contradictions present in the urban ecological planning 
process in Nanjing and how they have been (and can be) mediated both in Nanjing, 
and more broadly, in urban China as well. 
 
In short, this thesis is an attempt to reframe the prevailing critiques that privilege the 
state’s arbitrary role and expert’s technical role that often results in a dismal 
assessment of environmental governance. However, taking into account both the 
vi 
 
present day and historical context of China, this thesis offers a more nuanced 
explanation that recognizes that 1) the Chinese state/government will remain as the 
most crucial force in the environmental governance process for a long time to come 
and 2) the emerging and mediating role of ‘experts’ in urban (eco-) planning process 
which is crucial in promoting sound environmental governance and resolving 
present-day China’s environmental crises. 
 
Theoretically, this thesis marries ecological modernization theory and governance 
theory and demonstrates that there is no pre-formulated trajectory for cities to realize 
good environmental governance and accelerate the progress of ecological 
modernization. Although the pathway that China is currently treading on has many 
problematic issues that are perhaps unique to the Chinese state, its prospects remain 
promising provided that the Chinese government acts immediately to seek more 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Context of the Study 
The city, as the center of politics, economy and culture of a country or a region, 
is not only a lens through which we can observe the conveniences that urbanization 
and industrialization can bring about for the social and economic life of human beings; 
it is also a mirror that reflects the negative impact that such processes can have on the 
environment. With rapid urbanization and industrialization, China is facing a daunting 
task with its major cities remaining among the most polluted in the world. Dollar 
(2008), a researcher of the World Bank Group, has pointed out that China has 20 of 
the 30 most air-polluted cities in the world, with the health of urban dwellers being 
threatened by serious air pollution brought about by high coal usage and motorization. 
Furthermore, a sharp increase of urban sewage, city refuse and urban noises has also 
resulted in two other kinds of environmental problems in urban China. Apart from 
these pollution problems, water scarcity and traffic congestion – two symptoms of 
urban disease – are becoming more prevalent throughout China. According to Liu 
(2004), 180 out of 660 cities in China have a moderate shortage of water with 40 of 
them suffering severe water shortages. In addition, the worsening condition of 
automobile pollution in cities as a result of congested traffic also threatens the health 
of urban inhabitants. Fortunately, China has realized that these problems will hinder 
the progress of sustainable development or ecological modernization in urban China if 
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not properly tackled by environmental governance. Their increased practice of 
environmental governance can be seen in at least three dimensions. 
Firstly, environmental governance in China is often conducted in a top-down 
manner by the state. Given their dominance in China’s social order, I argue that the 
exercise of power by Chinese state apparatuses is crucial in providing the Chinese 
public with a good, healthy environment. To address the growing number of 
environmental crises, the Chinese government has on the one hand succeeded in 
increasing governmental environmental investments while establishing and improving 
a legal environmental framework on the other. Figure 1 shows clearly the growing 
trend of investments in China’s environmental protection industry indicated by the 
proportion of absolute governmental environmental investments to GDP - an increase 
from 1.01 percent of GDP in 2001 to 1.49 percent of GDP in 2008. China’s legal 
environmental framework also suggests that the beginning of serious intervention by 
Chinese governments with environmental governance coincided with the 
promulgation of the State Environmental Protection Law in 1979. Subsequently, four 
main principles – the polluter pays, prevention first, stronger environmental 
management, and local control – have guided the development of environmental 
protection laws and regulations in China. Since then, China has embarked on an 
attempt to build a systematic environmental legal system on a national level. As of 
2011, 19 environmental laws have been adopted by the National People’s Congress, 
65 executive regulations have been issued by the state council and 3217 sector 
regulations and environmental standards have been set by the Ministry of 
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Environmental Protection (LawInfo China, 2011).  
 
Figure 1 – Governmental environmental investments, 2001-2008: absolute (in 
billion RMB) and as proportion of GDP 
 
[Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (2001-2008)] 
 
In addition, these new environmental laws, regulations and standards are 
developed in tandem with a step-by-step process that enhance the bureaucratic status 
and the quantity and quality of staffs of national, provincial, city, county and township 
environmental agencies. Institutionally, the National Environmental Protection 
Agency was established in 1988, and in 1998 it received ministerial status as State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). In 2008, it was finally upgraded to the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This 
resulted in a commensurate increase in the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB)’s 
authority, especially so in cities, which can be regarded as a sign of decentralization. 
While the bureaucratic rankings of environmental agencies at different levels are 
increasing, Chinese governments have also been employing more officials with strong 
technical capabilities (Figure 2). Indeed, all these signs suggest that environmental 
protection is becoming increasingly important to the Chinese government.  
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Figure 2 – Governmental staff employed for environmental protection in China  
 
[Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (2003-2009)] 
 
Secondly, with growing awareness of environmental protection among the 
public, urban China has also placed the future of environmental governance in the 
hands of the Chinese citizens, opening the door to both local activism and local 
complaints. Recently, there have been many grassroots initiatives that encourage the 
public to conserve energy, participate in green commuting, reduce plastic bag usage 
and even draw green maps of green resources in their vicinity to increase their 
environmental awareness. At the same time however, there has also been growing 
pressure from citizens on local authorities to reduce environmental pollution. Figure 3 
demonstrates the total number of environmental complaints by letters and visits EPBs 
receive in China from 2003 to 2009 (Figure 3). Nevertheless, according to the 
Chinese Public’s Environment and Resident Livelihood Index (2007), public behavior 
continues to lag behind public awareness as almost half of the people surveyed 
regarded themselves as playing insignificant roles in environmental protection, with 
only 13.7% thinking of themselves as playing important or somewhat important roles 
in protecting the environment (Liu, 2008). To sum up, the Chinese government has 
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started to promote and enable citizen participation in environmental governance in 
urban China. It is therefore meaningful and appropriate at this juncture to explore 
existing, newly developing and future forms and approaches for increased citizens’ 
involvement in China’s environmental governance process. 
 
Figure 3 – Environmental complaints by letters and visits to EPBs 
 
[Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Environment (2003-2009)] 
 
Thirdly, China has increasingly engaged in urban ecological planning as a form 
of environmental governance. In her book Towards Green Civilization, Guo (2004) 
argues that urban ecological planning presents a viable solution to many 
environmental issues in urban China. Based on Ma’s (2009: 511) study on “eco-city 
and eco-planning in China”, the Chinese government has pushed for the formation 
and development of “a conservation-oriented and environment-friendly society” or 
what is also known as a “two-oriented society” since 2003. A new policy focusing on 
harmony between humanity and nature was also set. Meanwhile, a new notion, 
“conservation culture”, has appeared in China, which was first mentioned by 
President Hu Jintao during the 17th Chinese National Communist Party Congress in 
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October 2007. These new ideas have brought an overwhelming wave of urban 
ecological planning (eco-planning) in many cities in China. As a result, a lot of 
eco-city projects are being put into practice with the projects’ planning ideals being 
translated onto the ground to different extents (Table 1). All in all, 21st century urban 
ecological planning can be said to be the most desirable of strategies towards 
successful environmental governance in urban China.  
 
Table 1 – Six main eco-city projects and their current status in urban China 
Project name/ 
location 
Size/Year project started/cost of 
development 
Current status 
Dongtan eco city, 
Shanghai 
84.64 km²/1998/Registered 
Capital: 2.8billion CNY 




3000 acres/2005/Total investment 
(by 2008): 30 million CNY 
Merely 42 out of planned 400 houses 
had been built and until 2008, the 




30 km²/2007/Registered Capital: 
4 billion CNY 
In progress stage of development 
(phase II, 2011-2015) 
Caofeidian eco-city, 
Tangshan 
150 km²/2008/Expected total 
investment: 97.7 billion CNY 
(Expected total investment by 
2009: 20.67 billion CNY) 
In the period of constructing 





21011 km²/2008/By 2015, the 
total investment on 67 key 
construction projects in Kunming 
will amount to 54.773 billion 
CNY 
Key breakthrough phase (2008-2010) 
completed; in progress stage of 
speeding up (2011-2013) 
Sino-Singapore 




Capital: 99million US dollars 
(Expected total investment: 90 
billion CNY) 
In the phase of regulatory detailed 
planning 
 
However, the three abovementioned signs of environmental governance 
catching on in urban China should not distract us from the fact that failures of 
environmental governance regimes, limitations of citizen participation mechanisms 
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and specific contradictions within the urban ecological planning continue to exist. It is 
precisely these issues that are contributing to the heavily polluted urban environment 
in China that I want to problematize and address in this thesis.  
1.2 Study Objectives and Research Questions 
1.2.1 Study Objectives 
The overarching aim of this research is to problematize the notion of 
environmental governance in urban China especially in a specific city of Nanjing. 
This thesis looks at the core issue of environmental governance from three angles: the 
first perspective adopts the top-down environmental governance approach by the state, 
the second angle takes the bottom-up approach to environmental governance by the 
civil society, and finally the third looks at urban ecological planning as a form of 
environmental governance. Based on the above, I am interested in teasing out issues 
from three sub-themes: namely, the “contested environmental governance regimes in 
Nanjing”, the “limitations of citizen participation in environmental governance in 
Nanjing”, and “urban ecological planning as a form of environmental governance in 
Nanjing” (Figure 4: research framework). After analyzing the reasons for existing 
problems in these three sub-themes, the thesis will propose some effective 
countermeasures to these issues for the realization of good environmental governance 
and significant progress towards ecological modernization in the environmental 
governance process in Nanjing and more broadly in urban China. 
The contributions of this research are two-fold. Firstly, the study compensates 
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insufficient research in the existing literature on urban environmental governance by 
thoroughly examining three sub-themes of environmental governance in a city of a 
developing country. Secondly, the study not only uses both Ecological Modernization 
(EM) and Governance as two theoretical groundings to research urban environmental 
governance in the geographic scholarship, but also studies the nuanced difference 
between applying theories of Ecological Modernization and Governance (especially 
governmentality) in both the East and the West in the conclusion.  
 
Figure 4 – Research framework 
 
 
1.2.2 Research Questions 
(1) Why does the state/government play a leading role in establishing and 
implementing regimes to resolve environmental issues in urban China? Why are 
effective environmental governance regimes that involve both horizontal 
cooperation and vertical accountability hard to forge in both Nanjing and broadly 
in urban China?  
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(2) What issues are present in citizen participation and why is there still limited 
citizen participation in environmental governance in Nanjing? How can the 
Chinese government improve citizen participation rates in urban China?  
(3) How do the Nanjing Municipal governments, experts (these experts here 
especially referring to urban planners, ecologists, botanists and etc.) and Nanjing 
citizens negotiate with each other in the two eco-planning projects of the 
“Sino-Singapore Nanjing JXZ Eco High-tech Island” and the “Migration of 
Nanjing’s Iconic Phoenix Trees for Subway Expansion Plan”? Is the urban 
ecological planning process a promising form of environmental governance for 
both Nanjing and more broadly urban China?  
1.3 Research Methods 
Interviews and surveys are identified as the two main methods in the research 
procedure based on the three sub-themes of the thesis. Interviews are semi-structured, 
face-to-face and in depth discussions between the researcher and study subjects of 
approximately 30 minutes to an hour. Under the subtheme of “contested 
environmental governance regimes in Nanjing”, I conducted two interviews with two 
chief executives in two departments of the Nanjing Environmental Protection Bureau. 
To resolve key questions during discussions about “urban ecological planning: a 
promising form of environmental governance in Nanjing?”, I conducted four 
interviews with one governmental staff with good knowledge in China’s strategies of 
eco-city development, one urban planner who is responsible for the conceptual plan of 
“Sino-Singapore Nanjing JXZ Eco High-tech Island” and two professors who are 
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assessors of this project. In addition, I also interviewed 10 local residents holding 
different opinions of this project. In comparison with the nature of interview as a 
qualitative research method, survey is a useful quantitative research tool. I applied the 
survey method (see appendix for list of questions asked during survey) to analyze the 
present participatory situation of citizens in environmental governance in Nanjing 
through randomly sampling 50-60 volunteers in 6 urban districts in Nanjing (Figure 5). 
In total, the sample size of survey participants amounted to 330 respondents.   
 
Figure 5 - Six districts in the urban areas of Nanjing 
 
1.4 Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual framework 
within which Ecological Modernization (EM) theory and Governance theory are two 
threads that intertwine and run through the thesis. In particular, social 
environmentalism – as one crucial part of Ecological Modernization theory is 
carefully studied in Chapter 2. In addition, this chapter also uses Foucault’s (1991a) 
governmentality theory and Healey’s (1997) collaborative planning theory to clearly 
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explain the three dimensions of environmental governance. 
From Chapter 3 to Chapter 5, empirical studies corresponding to the three 
research sub-themes in the specific city of Nanjing are presented. Chapter 3 first 
argues that the state/government will remain as the most crucial force in building and 
implementing regimes to solve environmental crises for a long time in urban China. It 
then examines and problematizes contested environmental governance regimes, both 
horizontal cooperation and vertical accountability regimes, among related government 
agencies in environmental governance in Nanjing. Finally, having derived the reasons 
behind why effective environmental governance regimes are hard to forge in Nanjing, 
the chapter ends with some suggestions for governments to take in order to accelerate 
the progress of greening environmental governance regimes in Nanjing, and more 
broadly in urban China.  
While Chapter 4 discusses the limitations of a modern environmental 
governance mode based on citizen participation in Nanjing and more broadly in urban 
China. The central argument of this chapter is that it will be much wiser for the 
Chinese government to place strong emphasis on improving the citizen participation 
in urban China by taking some practical and suitable measures. As such, Chapter 4 
first illustrates briefly the functions, aspects and ways of citizen participation in 
environmental governance in urban China. Subsequently, the chapter propounds four 
main problems of citizen participation that arise in Nanjing which is also typical of 
urban China more broadly. From both subjective and objective aspects, the chapter 
identifies five contributing factors to why limited citizen participation in Nanjing does 
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not solidify the much-needed social foundation for the realization of good 
environment governance and goals that contribute towards ecological modernization 
in urban China. Finally, this chapter expounds some new thoughts and advances some 
measures which the government should think deeply about to improve the citizen 
participation mechanism in environmental governance in Nanjing and more broadly in 
urban China. 
Chapter 5 takes the position that urban ecological planning is a physical 
manifestation of ecological modernization and environmental governance in urban 
China. It first analyses how an urban ecological planning project (i.e. Sino-Singapore 
Nanjing JXZ Eco High-tech Island) is used as a third environmental governance 
approach to resolve urban environmental issues. Secondly, this chapter abstracts two 
main contradictions present in the eco-planning project of Nanjing that echo the main 
arguments of Chapter 3 and 4 - the governments’ planning intentions versus experts’ 
planning ideology, as well as experts’ planning ideology versus public opinion. 
Moreover, the chapter also draws on another interesting case – “Migration of 
Nanjing’s Iconic Phoenix Trees for Subway Expansion Plan” – to show that experts 
(such as urban planners, ecologists, botanists and etc.) who are under the control of 
the government in Nanjing can also lend their insights to lay individuals in their 
resistance against the government. In sum, this chapter contributes to understand that 
the Chinese government should be more open to alternative viewpoints both from 
experts and non-experts and pay more attention to citizenry resistance to its plans as 
aided by the guidance and know-how of experts. Finally, it concludes by placing 
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collaborative planning an integral part of environmental governance in urban China, 
arguing that collaborative planning is a very promising form that will enable China to 
realize good environmental governance and accelerate the progress of ecological 
modernization in Chinese cities of tomorrow.  
Finally, this thesis offers a summary and conclusions in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 
recapitulates the significance of the study by elaborating on both empirical and 
theoretical contributions to the existing literature. For empirical contributions, this 
chapter reviews findings relevant to each of my research questions. For theoretical 
contributions, it provides geographers with a nuanced understanding of how urban 
environmental governance can be addressed by using both Ecological Modernization 
(EM) and Governance (especially governmentality) theories both in the East and the 












Chapter 2 - Conceptual Framework  
 
Ecological Modernization (EM) theory and Governance theory, two 
foundational theories for this thesis, are like two threads of a string that twist together 
and run through argumentation throughout the paper. Firstly, Ecological 
Modernization theory focuses on resolving a radical and dialectical issue – 
“environment versus development.” Thus, it can be seen as an indispensable part of 
the thesis’s conceptual framework. On the other hand, because Ecological 
Modernization theory emerges as a new way of thinking and acting towards 
environmental crisis discussed mainly in developed Euro-American countries’ 
contexts, studying it in the context of developing China will fill the gaps in the 
existing literature. Thereby, in the following introduction to Ecological Modernization 
theory, I will first conduct a literature review of an Ecological Modernization theory 
debate and clearly define the notion of ecological modernization. Subsequently, I will 
carefully research a crucial part of Ecological Modernization theory – social 
environmentalism and ultimately teasing out how social environmentalism is applied 
in the Chinese context, which can further support arguments in following empirical 
studies of the thesis.  
Apart from using Ecological Modernization theory to look at the key thesis 
topic “urban environmental governance” from a broad view, I will also ground my 
analysis in the “Governance Theory,” which I previously referred to as the other 
“thread of a string” in my thesis. In some sense, it is obvious that governance theory 
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better supports the key thesis topic, because it corresponds to the topic in a more 
direct and detailed way. Therefore, to begin with discussions about this theory, I will 
first summarize different definitions of governance from past literature and derive my 
definition of governance based on my understanding of it in the Chinese context. 
After my deliberation on issues of an appropriate spatial scale and a proper policy 
domain in governance process, I will especially specify ‘urban governance’ and 
‘environmental governance’ as two sub-sections under the literature review of 
Governance Theory. Moreover, on account of my continual reevaluation of Foucault’s 
(1991a) governmentality theory and Healey’s (1997) collaborative planning theory, I 
will further elaborate three layers of environmental governance in term of the three 
sub-themes proposed in Chapter one of this thesis. These three environmental 
governance dimensions are top-down environmental governance by the state; 
bottom-up environmental governance by the civil society and environmental planning 
as a form of governance. 
2.1 Ecological Modernization 
2.1.1 Literature Review on Ecological Modernization Theory 
The idea of Ecological Modernization (EM) first arose when Joseph Huber 
(1982) proposed the ecological switch-over as the new phase in the process of 
industrialization. Beginning back in 1980s, the distinct green ideology assumed an 
independent status and could no longer be interpreted in terms of the old political 
ideologies of socialism, liberalism and conservatism (Giddens, 1994; Paehlke, 1989). 
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According to Mol (2000) the Ecological Modernization theory originated in the early 
1980s and became a social theory in the 1990s. The basic logic of Ecological 
Modernization theory, often argued in European policy analysis, has close affinities to 
several related literatures – particularly embedded autonomy, civil society, and 
state-society synergy theories in political sociology (Buttel, 2000). Although the logic 
of Ecological Modernization theory can be interpreted in various ways based on 
different authors and contexts, some main features can be identified throughout.  
Firstly, science and technology, with its own continuous innovative progress, 
will help solve environmental problems in modern society. In this sense, ecological 
modernization can be accomplished by replacing old end-of-pipe technological 
regimes with certain improved institutions, which will positively influence the whole 
process of production and the resulting products (see Huber, 1991; Christoff, 1996). 
Secondly, Ecological Modernization theory identifies the significance of economic 
and market dynamics and balanced relationships between entrepreneurs, state 
agencies, and social groups in environmental protection (see Hajer, 1995). Thirdly, 
Ecological Modernization theory echoes Jänicke’s (1993) notion of the modernization 
of political processes and stresses the need for ‘institutional learning’ (see Spaargaren 
and van Vliet, 2000; Mol, 2000; Langhelle, 2000; Fudge et al, 2001; Gouldson et al, 
2008). This idea of ‘institutional learning’ is closely related to the central arguments in 
the following three empirical chapters in the thesis. Actually, institutional learning is a 
fundamental part of the wider process of ecological modernization because dominant 
political institutions should internally change their management regimes through their 
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reflexive learning, such as transforming a state from a role of curative, centralized and 
coercive to preventative, decentralized and participatory or rather shaping alternative 
forms of supra-national political institutions to resolve environmental crisis 
internalized in modern society. 
Apart from these angles to understand Ecological Modernization theory, 
Ecological Modernization theory also focuses on social approaches to environmental 
issues and the cultural or ideological aspect of this change (Seippel, 2000; see also 
Keil and Desfor, 2003; May, 2008). Hajer (1995) argues in favor of this point by first 
criticizing some potential pitfalls of relying too much on a growing force of 
professionals and technocrats in many institutional changes in ecological 
modernization, while neglecting the politics of civil society in this interpretation. In 
his viewpoint, technology, rather than nature itself, is out of our hands, and public 
perceptions and reactions to the environmental crisis should not be overlooked 
because they are new alternative democratic forms during crisis management. In 
Hajer’s (1995: 281) own words, “alternatively, ecological modernization fosters a 
public domain where social realities and social preferences determine which actions 
should be taken”. The core challenge to the abovementioned perception of Ecological 
Modernization here seems to concern the organization of ecological modernization as 
a social process during which social choices are made democratically. The thought of 
ecological modernization as a social process is relevant to the suggestions and 
recommendations for different issues under the three sub-themes in the case studies of 
this thesis. Correspondingly, these thoughts on environmental crisis as social crisis 
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with nature complement my understanding of ecological modernization as “social 
environmentalism”.  
Thus, ecological modernization theory is not only about using the cutting edge 
technology and market mechanism to resolve environmental issues but is more related 
with adoption of some institutional changes and social approaches on environmental 
regulation. As is well known, China is seeing the rise of public environmentalism in 
recent decades, hence it is necessary that social environmentalism as the most relevant 
concept in Ecological Modernization theory should be carefully researched in the 
following paragraphs.  
2.1.2 Social Environmentalism 
First of all, social environmentalism teaches us that societies must become 
sustainable. Unsustainable societies – frustrated by different kinds of social insecurity, 
inequality and conflicts – are bound to result in worsening environmental conditions 
and exhausted resources. This chaos in social environmentalism is basically due to a 
lack of moral thinking in a social relations crisis. In fact, moral growth in a society is 
a sine qua non for complete resolution of environmental issues. In comparison with 
market environmentalism, the commitment to fulfilling social environmentalism 
transcends private motivations in favor of some form of social even-handedness. This 
view, linking ideas of justice and democracy indicates some form of deliberation and 
collective agreement on how to address the relation of power in society. According to 
Habermas, a rational society should endow as many free people as possible with the 
responsibility of participating in the “public sphere”. This public sphere is imbued 
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with different people’s interests and values, negotiating with each other and trying to 
decide what normative agenda is important for a society (Habermas 1974, 49-53). The 
normative agenda in the discourse of social environmentalism is about rethinking 
power and its democratization. To problematize different meanings of power under 
the ‘social environmentalism’ discourse, my arguments here rest on three 
considerations that in many aspects throw new light on some of the subsequent 
important viewpoints elaborated in the three sub-themes of this thesis.  
In the first place, power of production is a classic topic within the discourse of 
ecological modernization centering on the relationship between economy and ecology. 
Paraphrasing Pepper’s opinions on eco-socialism, he writes that the development of 
productive forces is an important element in an ecological communist utopia and 
eco-socialist growth must be a rational, planned development for everyone’s equal 
benefit, thus resulting in an ecological benign circumstance (Pepper, 1993: 219). In 
this sense, I believe social environmentalism first has to consider the extent of human 
production. In fact, it will be impossible for sustainability if there is no upper limit of 
the development of productive forces. Once setting these limits, another contradiction 
as jobs versus environment occurs in Keil (1994: 16), who has argued “real process 
on the environmental front was translated into real job loss in working class 
communities”. However, I agree more with Sarkar’s (1999: 208) thoughts on 
unemployment and employment issues in his understanding about eco-socialism, 
which claim that by using labor-intensive technologies, promoting a low-level 
steady-state economy, and controlling population, an environmentally sustainable 
20 
 
society should be coupled with full and rewarding employment. 
A second consideration of power under social environmentalism is that the 
restructuring of power relations is tied up with new ways of conceptualizing space 
and spatial scale. Thus arises the question of what kinds of spaces coexist in this 
discourse. Are these spaces similar with Foucault’s spatial thought about ‘heterotopia’ 
featured by pure different, hierarchical (with one layer on top of the other), 
independent (parallel) and functional (Foucault, 1986)? Or rather, are they more like 
the space conceptualized by Massey (2005) as a sphere of “multiple, coeval, open, 
relational, unfinished and always becoming” (Massey, 2005: 8, 59)? By sifting the 
essence through both spatial theories, conceptualizing space in the social 
environmentalism discourse pays more attention to different spaces with multi-level 
layers that can overlap with each other. Apart from that, local spatial scales and 
international spatial scales are specially appreciated in this discourse. Arguably, the 
conceptions of space are always related to the exercise of power. So correspondingly, 
in the discourse of social environmentalism, there are connected pluralistic forms of 
authority in which local autonomous authority and some strong international 
organizations should be encouraged to function independently at their proper spatial 
scales, ultimately because a strong state is not associated with the economic and 
political ideals of democracy. 
Thirdly, the reshaping of power relations in social environmentalism discourse 
is not only bound up with production and spatial issues, but also involves the 
‘environmentalist’ identity issues. Unlike its cousin market environmentalism, which 
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reinforces environmentalist identity as ‘capitalists’, ‘managers’ or ‘consumers’, social 
environmentalism seeks to link the identity of ‘environmentalist’ with free and equal 
individuals rather than ‘technocrats’, ‘experts’ or ‘elites’. These lay individuals should 
not merely play a part in lobbying the state; instead they ought to play a role as 
decision-makers in deliberative multi-stakeholder negotiations where the state is just 
one actor amidst many. Bearing public values in mind, these ‘environmentalists’ in 
social environmentalism discourse are eager to determine the true meanings and 
purposes of production, of work, and of the control over economic decision-making. 
If the meanings and purposes are against their perceptions on environmentalism, they 
will stand opposed to this undesirable hegemonic control. Out of similar consideration, 
Adkin (1992b, 1994) thinks that social environmentalism is, after all, a 
counter-hegemonic discourse formed by the re-articulation of elements of existing 
identities, values, and conceptions of need.  
2.1.3 Social Environmentalism in China 
 
Based on Kristy Michaud et al.’s (2008: 22) distinction between 
‘environmentalism’ and ‘nimbyism’ (‘not-in-my-backyard’) in China, they argue that 
environmentalist activists are those who possess ‘a more general attitude that supports 
and prioritises the natural environment as important to human life’; by contrast, 
nimby activists engage in ‘localised opposition to a specific development that is often 
opposed in the name of environmental protection’. In fact in China, there are two 
facets of social environmentalism: one focuses on environmental NGOs, and the other 
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resembles the NIMBY movement. The similarity of both facets of social 
environmentalism is that NGOs and nimbies both demand better access to 
participatory means in order to influence decisions proactively on environmental 
governance.  
In the last decades, on one hand Chinese environmental NGOs have 
successfully held lots of public campaigns against pollution issues, exposing 
government environmental misconduct, and promoting new principles. While on the 
other hand, these nimbies’ actions against environmental issues range from complains 
by letters and visits, petition, peaceful public sitting or public strolling (ji ti san bu) to 
much stronger ways of opposition such as blocking the factory, throwing stones to 
local governmental buildings or vandalizing official properties. Based on both two 
faces of social environmentalism in China, we can see that while the latter usually is a 
result of ‘collective grievance and victimhood, and aims at compensation with or 
without eventual policy changes, environmental NGOs organize their activism with 
long-term goals, aiming at promoting public goods, and make political compromises 
with state agencies when necessary’ (Wu, 2010: 3).  
Although social environmentalism within China, to certain extent, appears to 
resemble social movements in the West, it takes on special qualities under current 
circumstance in China where advocates are not endowed with enough freedom of 
speech, where democracy and rights are not constitutionally guaranteed very well, and 
where power flows across multiple levels of governments and their affiliated 
institutions. These special qualities of social environmentalism in China are like some 
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features in ‘authoritarian environmentalism’ described by Shearman and Smith (2007) 
and Beeson (2010a), like state and experts being almost the only two key players in 
the environmental management process. To elaborate these features of ‘authoritarian 
environmentalism’ further in the context of East Asia, Beeson’s (2010a: 276-281) 
perceptions on this conception from two perspectives should be highlighted. One is a 
‘decrease in individual liberty’ that keeps individuals from carrying out unsustainable 
actions and forces them to comply with more sustainable policies. The second is about 
policy making and policy implementing processes that are led by a comparatively 
autonomous central state giving little or no legal force or status to social actors and 
their representatives. Both understandings about ‘authoritarian environmentalism’ 
echo on Shearman and Smith’s (2007: 125-141) emphases about this conception that 
one’s personal liberty being abridged as well as policy processes being solely in the 
state’s hands. Besides, they also attach much importance to the role of scientists and 
technocrats in steering state policy. In their model, not only does the state but also 
scientific and technocratic elite – what they called ‘ecoelites’ – take charge of 
formulating and implementing policy. In a word, authoritarian environmentalism can 
be provisionally defined as a public policy model that concentrates authority in some 
state agencies managed by competent and uncorrupt elites seeking to get significant 
improved environmental outcomes.  
Here arises one question: is social environmentalism in China a good public 
policy model that can actually deliver improved environmental outcomes? Or in other 
words, are present state-society relationships and expert-individual relationships 
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during the process of environmental governance in China good enough that can result 
in sustainable environmental systems? Those remain subjects of empirical inquiry in 
chapter 3-5. Based on these questions, because the governance theory can better and 
more clearly explain the dialectical relationships between state and civil society, 
experts and individuals in the process of environmental governance in urban China, it 
is the high time that Governance Theory should be introduced in the following 
sub-section of Conceptual Framework in the thesis. 
2.2 Governance Theory 
2.2.1 Defining Governance 
Within the consolidation of new government technologies with parameters of 
political democracy (Swyngedouw, 2005), the term ‘governance’ is broadly used in 
governing processes all over the world. Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004: 
151-152) elucidate some common characteristics of this concept: first of all, 
governance is pluri-centric rather than unicentric; secondly, it privileges some new 
actors (especially private economic actors) in social networks while disempowering 
formal government agencies, or rather, treating them as just one kind of important 
actor among many others; thirdly, it concerns governing processes more related with 
accommodation, negotiation and cooperation – “a politics of patience” in Appadurai’s 
(2001) words – rather than coercion, command and control in the traditional 
government processes. In addition to this definition of governance, Van Vliet (2008: 3) 
explains that governance involves multiple stakeholders who share the same purpose 
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for public goods and explores how governance blurs the boundaries between the 
public and private, formal and informal, state, market and civil society sectors. 
Moreover, it also addresses the following three key tasks: coordinating, steering and 
integrating in a society.  
To capture the essence of abovementioned two definitions of governance 
concept, I echo on Painter’s (2000) definition and derive my definition of governance 
as “the involvement of a wide range of institutions and actors in the production and 
implementation of policy outcomes”, one sub-process of which is collaboration and 
coordination within and between three dimensions: (1) state and sub-state institutions, 
(2) market-economy institutions (such as private companies), and (3) some 
institutions (such as Non-Governmental Organizations) and individuals in the civil 
society.  
Based on my understanding of governance in the Chinese context, there are 
three dimensions of it: the first one is state governance. State governance refers to 
governance by the institutions of the nation-state and its sub-national components. 
Although state power is eroded because globalization is replacing traditional concepts 
of power and authority of nation-states with a new sovereign regime, as well as 
promoting emergence of new non-territorial forms of organization, the state/sub-state 
in China nevertheless remains fundamental to provide the legal framework for all 
such domestic market-economy and civil society institutional and individual activities. 
Secondly, regarding market-economy governance response to environmental crisis in 
China, industrial activities that generate environmental problems by both domestic 
26 
 
and multinational corporations, must be constrained by policies or regulations 
formulated by the state or sub-state. For this reason, business corporations also initiate 
environmental governance mechanisms of their own to avoid more stringent 
regulation by China’s state agencies. While, lastly, concerning civil society 
governance for the resolution of environmental issues, non-state organizations and 
individuals in the civil society of China have become comparatively more important 
within the overall process of governance. 
It occurs to me that these three dimensions within the overall process of 
governance in China are far from being democratic and satisfactory, because the 
denotation of true democratic governance seems to be political equality with an idea 
that “every individual potentially affected by a decision should have an equal 
opportunity to affect the decision” (Warren, 2002: 678; see also Dahl, 2006). 
Nevertheless, as Klingemann has put it (1999: 32): 
 
The fact of dissatisfaction does not imply danger to the persistence or 
furtherance of democracy. A significant number of people spread 
around the world can be labeled ‘dissatisfied democrats’. They clearly 
approve of democracy as a mode of governance, but they are 
discontented with the way their own system is currently operating. The 
dissatisfied democrats can be viewed less a threat to, than a force for, 
reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures as the 
third wave continues to flow. 
 
It seems that the reform and improvement of democratic governance in China is 
both imperative and promising. But what is an appropriate scale at which the 
substitution of an improved democratic governance regime for the original one would 
happen? And what is a proper policy domain for embodiment of this transformation? 
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Two factors – too often overlooked and underappreciated – as governance at urban 
scale (aka urban governance) and governance within the domain of environment (aka 
environmental governance) are indeed central to this research. 
Urban Governance 
Urban is an adjective related to a particular type of human habitation: the city. 
Generally speaking, a city is a relatively large human settlement comprised of a 
non-agricultural population and industries. In China, cities can be categorized into 
four types in terms of their non-agricultural population numbers in their urban and 
inner suburban districts (namely, extra-large city: population number > 1,000,000; 
large city: 500,000 < population number ≤ 1,000,000; medium city: 200,000 < 
population number ≤ 500,000; and small city: population number < 200,000). Echoing 
this idea, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
defines a city as “a populous place”. Apart from the urban feature of size (large area 
and large population), Louis Wirth’s (1938) time-tested definition of a city as “large, 
dense and heterogeneous” tells us that urbanity can also be examined by density and 
that scholars want to capture the physical and social heterogeneity of urban areas as 
well. With the rapid development of societies and their economies and technologies, 
urban forms have changed greatly, and they will continue changing in the future. 
Taking recent changing urban forms into consideration, Lofland (1998: 7) argues that 
the changed urban forms should be read as metropolitan areas, including “various 
sized settlements” (such as urban areas, suburban districts and even nearby towns), 
and that this metropolitan area is “visually distinct from its surroundings”. For 
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theoretical research, examining the other side of the picture is equally important. In 
this vein, I will emphasize what “urban” does not mean rather than what it does. In 
fact, adjectives like ‘small’, ‘rural’ and ‘sparsely populated’ are irrelevant to the 
meaning of ‘urban’. Further, in light of ‘urban’ as a spatial scale, ‘urban’ does not 
refer to an international arena, a nation state, a vast region including sparsely 
inhabited areas, nor just a district or residential district within a city. With these 
contrasting sides of ‘urban’ in mind, we can conclude that the underlying meanings of 
‘urban’ are two-fold: firstly, it indicates a type of society – that is, dense and distinct; 
secondly, it refers to a scale of governance – that is, municipal. This understanding 
may potentially be criticized, such as how a metropolitan area may contain more than 
one municipality and is of lower density than a city. However, in my opinion, this 
kind of area is nevertheless urban because it tells us a similar urban story about its 
non-rural society, which is governed by local municipal politics. Subsequently, I will 
firmly stand my ground that urban scale is the appropriate scale for implementing 
democratic governance, which I alluded to at the end of the last paragraph. Because of 
two arguments I offer here: 1), there is not only an upward vertical shift in governance 
from national to international governments, but also a downward shift from national 
to sub-national and local levels in governance; and 2), local autonomous authority 
should be encouraged to function fairly independently at the possible smallest spatial 
scale because a strong state is not quite associated with the ideal of democracy, I 
believe that urban level of governance is relatively a small spatial scale linked with 




Environmental governance literally means governing the environment. Two 
contending sides of this policy domain in urban governance rest on a critique of the 
dualism of ‘society’ and ‘nature’ (Harvey, 1996; Smith, 2006). In the simplistic 
separation of society and nature, on one hand, the word ‘environment’ or ‘nature’ is 
exclusively used to describe a non-human physical world. On the other hand, man 
fights for and against nature in order to control this ‘external’ world. Seen in this way, 
man has dominion over the natural world. Furthermore, referencing Smith’s (2006: xi) 
argument about a virtue of society’s separation from nature in capitalism, “the 
expansion of capitalistic technology has accomplished a very real if limited separation 
of society from various natural constrains and in ways more aggressive and complete 
than any previous social formation”. It seems misguided to accept such a dualism 
because the distance between ‘us’ – that is, human beings – and ‘it’ – that is, nature – 
is not likely to realistically occur. Actually, we – human beings – are part of ‘it,’ and 
there is no detached individual who can stand outside nature and see the whole picture 
of ‘it’. In this regard, this dichotomy completely lacks the dynamics linking living 
humans with other things in the environment (see also Tetsuhiko, 1999: 1-2). United 
closely with nature, human variables, arguably the most important variables, have 
been spotlighted in the discussion of environment. Taking points from Parson (2000: 
S124), human governance of the environment takes place against a background of 
problems in biophysical environment, which underpins environmental concerns and 
environmental policy. Furthermore, environmental issues should not be addressed 
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only in physical and biological domains, but rather from broader perspectives of 
social sciences; environmental problems are really psychological, sociological, 
anthropological and philosophical problems. It is not difficult to determine from 
Koger and Winter’s (2010: 2) research on psychological dimension of environment 
that environmental problems are “caused by the thoughts, beliefs, values, and 
worldviews upon which human beings act”. 
Nor is it hard to find some constructive ways to confront seemingly 
contradictory social definitions of environmental problems. For Harvey (1996: 117), 
social and cultural meaning is the kernel of all aspects of the environment: 
 
The “environmental issue” necessarily means such different things to 
different people, that in aggregate it encompasses quite literally 
everything there is. Business leaders worry about the political and 
legal environment, politicians worry about the economic environment, 
city dwellers worry about the social environment and, doubtless, 
criminals worry about the environment of law enforcement, and 
polluters worry about the regulatory environment. That a single word 
should be used in such a multitude of ways testifies to its fundamental 
incoherence as a unitary concept. 
 
Herein lies a multiplicity of meanings of environment that can be classified into three 
categories as macro-, meso-, and micro- environments – from our atmospheric and 
water environments and nation’s, province’s or municipality’s administrative 
environments to billions of personal subjective environments. Based on these multiple 
meanings about this concept, the word ‘environment’ used everyday needs to be 
defined more generally and flexibly. This type of universal definition was introduced 
by Harvey (1996: 118) who states that “‘environment’ is, after all, whatever surrounds 
or, to be more precise, whatever exists in the surroundings of some being that is 
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relevant to the state of that being at a particular place and time”. 
Upon realization that the separation between nature and society as well as social 
and cultural aspects are central to the meaning of the environment, the politics of 
‘environment’ of and for a city need to be integrated into a more established ‘social’ 
politics (cf. social environmentalism). That is to say, environmental governance is a 
form of governance governing that which exists in a specific society’s surroundings 
and is relevant to the state and well-being of everything and everyone within that 
specific society. All in all, a politics regarding environmental issues is necessarily and 
concurrently a politics for social relations change with its instantiation in natural 
environment of a certain regime of values. Noticeably, the relationship between 
humans’ values and the environment – whether before or after social relations change 
– is particularly interesting here. The model of the cultural filter depicted by Jeans in 
1974 shows us that the real environment is seen by humans through a cultural filter, 
made up of their attitudes, limits set by observation techniques, and past experience 
(Figure 6). By studying the filter and reconstructing the perceived environment, the 














Figure 6 – The cultural filter 
 
[Source: Jeans, D. (1974)] 
 
Interestingly, this model also casts light on environmental governance in modern 
cities. To begin with, autonomous people in modern society are indeed more political 
beings than merely human beings. Based on this model, different political beings (like 
government officials, citizens, and experts) in modern cities will have different 
attitudes, techniques and past experiences with which to perceive the real environment. 
Then, their different perceived environments will strongly influence their decisions to 
change any social relations within those environments, ultimately, to regulate the 
society of a whole. Usually decisions are realized through different environmental 
governance approaches; but very probably, some environmental governance 
approaches will operate smoothly while remaining magnitude pressures for the 
operation of others. The possible reason for this phenomenon is that just a small 
number of political beings with strong political forces can freely choose different 
kinds of governance approaches. Although many governance approaches are almost in 
the hands of powerful political beings, many ordinary political beings can more or 
less regulate the environment or society per se through their own cultural filters. In 
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this sense, when we look at the environmental governance processes through the 
lenses in these cultural filters, we can observe different political possibilities and 
governance patterns coexisting in the urban context, even though some political 
regime and its governance approaches may achieve dominance over others. Next, I 
will expound my views on three environmental governance dimensions that will pave 
the way for further discussions in the following chapters 3-5 of the thesis. They are 
top-down environmental governance by the state, bottom-up environmental 
governance by the civil society and environmental planning as a form of governance. 
To illustrate to what extent these governance dimensions can show characteristics of 
democracy and to support my subsequent theoretical debate, I will borrow some core 
ideas from Foucault’s (1991a) governmentality theory and Healey’s (1997) 
collaborative planning theory. 
2.2.2 Environmental Governance and Its Relevance in the Thesis 
Top-down Environmental Governance by the State 
State power affects almost all aspects of social and economic life in deep-rooted 
and enduring ways; undoubtedly, environmental issues are deeply influenced by the 
state. Every year, new aspects of social and economic life undergo regulation, 
intervention and manipulation by the state, while the fragmentation and formation of 
social and economic geography is closely related to state power as well. Throughout 
the history of human civilization, territorial nation states all over the globe have 
achieved their different dominant forms of government to rule their societies. 




“First, the state is a set of public institutions: government ministries, 
public services, military and police forces, legal systems, and so on. 
Second, the state is territorial: modern states cannot overlap 
geographically; they have fixed and clear (though often disputed) 
borders and, in principle, they exercise power evenly across their 
territories. Third, the state controls the legitimate means of violence, 
including the armed forces and imprisonment.” 
 
This traditional definition of ‘state’ echoes both Foucault’s notion of ‘pastoral power’ 
(2007) and his thoughts about bio-politics in the discussion of ‘governmentality’ 
(1991a). The ‘pastoral power’ is based on the Christian theme of the shepherd and the 
flock. According to Foucault (2007: 194-195), the shepherd can guide and examine 
his flock to make members of the flock obedient to his leadership. The practices of 
guidance, examination and obedience pertain to the objective of this power, which is 
to let individuals work on their own ‘mortification’. Here, the metaphor of ‘shepherd’ 
can be considered some way analogous to the state while the image of his flock 
represents living individuals. However, to look at contemporary ‘pastoral power’, the 
flock no longer only refers to living individuals but, by extension, to the citizens with 
scientific knowledge and political and legal rights. In this sense, the ‘pastoral power’ 
in modern societies should be utilized as what Foucault called bio-politics, otherwise 
this power’s effects would decrease. 
In Foucault’s account of ‘bio-politics’ from his deliberation on 
‘governmentality’, the art of governing by the state should not separate sovereignty, 
discipline and government; in fact, they are supposed to be lumped together as a 
triangle – “sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the 
population and its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security” (1991a: 102). In a 
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nutshell, from Foucault’s idea about bio-politics, by using the tool of 
‘sovereignty-discipline-government’ triangle state can rule the society with 
considerations of health, welfare, prosperity, happiness and efficiency for the whole 
population.  
In my opinion, the ‘sovereignty-discipline-government’ triangle is just one of 
many forms of intuitional management under a specific discourse of a modern society. 
However, there is a great variety of prevailing discourses in modern societies and 
most recently the prevailing discourse supports an involvement of different sorts of 
actors and institutions with a particular form of coordination in the production of 
policy outcomes, “there is a movement from the central role of official state 
apparatus….towards an emphasis on partnerships between governmental, 
para-governmental and non-governmental organizations in which state apparatus is 
often only first among equals” (Jessop, 1997a: 574-575; see also Baber and Bartlett, 
2005). Due to these ever-changing prevailing discourses, the state is as a political 
project with continuing institutional experimentation and reform.  
Against the background of most recent global economic and political 
transformation, I especially focus on the recent prevailing discourse I illustrated above, 
which advances a more democratic government mode – governance. It seems that the 
nation-state has lost its pre-eminent position as the most fundamental political 
authority in governance. Although a more complex picture of governance involves a 
number of organizations apart from state apparatuses and a former strong state power 
is challenged in many ways, Painter (1999: 298) conducts research on the elected 
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governments at national and local scales in the United Kingdom and argues they 
remain the most important elements in the geography of governance. In the UK’s case, 
local government can be treated like a big business by spending ￡45 billion money a 
year on providing different services and employing almost 2 million people to deliver 
them; Additionally, local governments are subordinated to national government, 
which gives rise to a situation of ‘partial autonomy’, especially when deciding to 
respond to local needs and demands. So state power at a variety of spatial scales is not 
dead at all, and to the contrary, states at different levels remain vital structures of 
government or governance. For many years to come, states will continue to have an 
intense involvement in the production and transformation of economic, political and 
social processes within which economic, political and social geographies are changed 
as well. 
As previously mentioned, the state is always in the process of formation, 
deformation and reformation, and there is an inevitable continual line of modification 
on state – in Foucault’s term ‘the governmentalization of the state’ (Foucault, 1991a: 
103). These trajectories of ‘governmentalization of the state’ are multiple and 
disparate in different situations, which justifies the coexistence of a plurality of 
government everywhere and anywhere at any given time in the world. This idea 
recalls Massey’s (2005) notions about space, which can have multiple meanings and 
co-occur simultaneously and can be produced in accordance with multifaceted 
trajectories. Based on this reflection, we can determine there is no inevitable 
trajectory of government or governance over all states in the world. In other words, 
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the trajectory of government applicable in the UK might be inappropriate in the 
Chinese context and need revision. Thereby, in CHAPTER THREE, I will address 
some distinct issues of contested governmental regimes in environmental governance 
in Nanjing. 
Bottom-up Environmental Governance by the Civil Society 
Regarding civil society governance in response to environmental politics, due 
to problems of environmental scarcity and degradation, Valadez (2001) thinks it is 
necessary to construct a ground for ethical commitments that will encourage the 
development of a society that is both more sustainable and more just. This kind of 
society is defined by Held (1995) as the civil society, that is, an area of life beyond 
direct state and economic control shaped by voluntary and private arrangements 
between individuals and groups. For a long time, the place of individuals and groups 
in civil society in the process of developing and implementing public policies was 
deemed trivial. Concretely speaking, many members of civil society must lobby state 
authorities to get more public rights and thus endure an identity crisis due to lack of 
legal authorization. The more important point, however, is that civil society never 
separates from the state, and individual and collective activities in civil society can 
only function through a comprehensive legal framework provided by national or local 
state. In a word, throughout history, civil society has been marginalized and 
overshadowed by the state when addressing environmental issues. 
In contemporary environmental politics, participatory environmental 
governance becomes situated at the top of agenda (Kim et al, 2005). This agenda 
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advocates a kind of participatory democracy which requires a radical equality of 
access for individuals and groups in civil society to participate intelligently and 
reasonably in various areas of politics. The role of civil society in participatory 
democracy demonstrates at least two important issues in the “governmental regimes 
of ‘truth’” (A term I borrow from Foucault, 1997: 32): first, members of civil society 
are able to govern themselves, and norms of consensus can be shaped by way of their 
mutual interaction; second, critically inclined members of civil society know their 
rights to question and resist defects in governmental regimes.  
On one hand, citizens in modern governance are regarded as rational and 
reasonable and are more responsible than pre-modern individuals for governing 
themselves and making decisions. Actually, the individual scale of self-governance is 
the other remarkable tenet (apart from one tenet I already illustrated named 
‘bio-politics’ above) of ‘governmentality theory’. Foucault (1991a: 91) says, “in the 
art of government the task is to establish a continuity, in both an upwards and a 
downwards direction”. Here the ‘downward direction’ reflects a significant trend of 
government towards individualized self management. To this point, I seek to highlight 
an argument made by Foucault (1991a) about a dilemma of modern government. He 
considers that “if one governs too much one finishes by not being able to govern at 
all.” So the underlying assumption of this sentence clarifies that the practice of 
government is not coercion or overt methods in controlling society. The success of 
“normalizing society” (Foucault, 2003: 253) or a state lies in diffusion of power and 
self-governance. Moreover, it is also important for modern citizens to understand 
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other citizens’ or agents’ identities and actors in the civil society, because through 
their “reciprocal expectations about behavior” (Habermas 1970: 92), participants will 
produce shared intentions and reach consensual norms to cope with common 
problems. Identifying with these consensual norms that govern them, members of 
civil society do not just have obligations to govern themselves; rather via their mutual 
supervision, they can govern others in case of any undesirable behavior that arises 
against the consensus they build together.  
On the other hand, in modern urban governance, there are many distinctly 
different interests and perspectives between civil society and state authority. So 
bottom-up resistance to policy failure in modern government is bound to result. 
Deliberating on Foucault’s notion about “pastoral counter-conducts” (Foucault, 2007) 
against ‘pastoral power’, these counter-conducts do not simply negate pastoral 
conducts; rather they are a dynamic mechanism “whose objective [was] a different 
form of conduct, that is to say: wanting to be conducted differently, by other leaders 
and other shepherds, towards other objectives and forms of salvation, and through 
other procedures and methods”. In Foucault’s words from his interview in 1984, a 
year before his death, he claimed that resistance is a creative process: “to create and 
recreate, to transform the situation, to participate actively in the process, that is to 
resist” (see Lazzarato, 2002). So, in my mind, resistance or contestation is superior to 
other forces of urban modern governance because it redraws boundaries of expertise, 
and it challenges authority from below (see also Raco & Imrie, 2000). When pursuing 
governmental regimes of ‘truth’, staying only at the level of resistance to modern 
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government is insufficient; empowerment on rights of subjects to question or critique 
present defects of governmental regimes should be given a higher priority because the 
‘rights to question’ manifests as an objective of freedom in modern governance. This 
freedom end of governance demands civil society members to self-transform from 
objects of government to governable subjects. This transformation of subjectivities 
can promote civil societies’ and institutional conducts consistent. All in all, the logic 
of bottom-up environmental governance presents two key points in the discourse of 
participatory democracy: first, this mode of governance in civil society brings 
individual scale of self-governance and consensus building into sharp focus; then, an 
equal system of fundamental liberties in this governance mode is provided for 
different agents of the civil society, so that they are fully capable of exercising their 
own rights to critique and resist existing problematic governmental regimes. 
Explaining to what extent these characters of bottom-up environmental governance 
can be demonstrated in urban China’s context, empirically, CHAPTER FOUR will 
narrate an interesting story about limited citizen participation in environmental 
governance in Nanjing. 
Environmental Planning as a Form of Governance 
From Healey’s (1997: 218) standpoint that “planning, understood in the general 
sense of the policy analysis tradition, is a style of governance within a policy-driven 
approach”, environmental planning, as a branch of knowledge of planning and since 
its appearance in the 1960s, is thus a part of governance characterized by an 
environmental policy-driven approach. Indeed, environmental planning as a discrete 
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functional area within the broader field of government is driven by enforceable 
policies formulated by the government to deal with problems arising at the 
society-environmental interface. In the course of devising action to solve these 
problems, a variety of environmental planning approaches are put into practice. 
Literature on planning theory collectively identifies various ways public 
policies are made in different decision-making contexts and propounds various 
approaches to planning, reflecting different philosophies about how environmental 
problems can be defined, analyzed and resolved. Generally, the planning approaches 
can be classified into six main categories (Briassoulis, 1989). However, limited to the 
length of this thesis, I will particularly specify two planning approaches as 
comprehensive/rational planning supported by Faludi (1973) and collaborative 
planning proposed by Healey (1997) in the following paragraphs.  
In the first place, the comprehensive approach finds rational solutions to 
environmental problems, and it is the first approach to be applied in environmental 
planning. Proponents of comprehensive planning argue this approach ensures 
environmentally sound problem solutions through its comprehensive analysis system, 
reasonable choice selection processes, and coordination between related jurisdictional 
agencies. From Faludi’s (1973: 4) view on ‘normative theories of planning’, the 
comprehensive planning approach should be classified as ‘normative political theory’ 
that is concerned with “how planners ought to proceed rationally” for “the validity of 
rationality as a normative ideal”. In the comprehensive planning approach, planners 
are experts lending their skills and insights to the process of environmental 
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governance; this expert’s authority shows that science and expertise still have an 
overall cachet and legitimacy to lead conducts of the lay audience. Nevertheless, 
drawbacks of this planning approach are conspicuous. First, the decision-making 
context of this approach is too idealized and grounded in ‘instrumental rationalism’ 
(Muller, 1992) serving mere technocratic and corporatist modes of governance; 
second, the environmental problems are resolved owing to the centralization of power 
and authority, which is undesirable in any democratic societies famous for their 
citizen participation mechanisms in the planning process.  
In the second place, Healey (1997) describes another way of approaching 
planning, that is, collaborative planning. This approach is much more efficacious, 
responsive, and politically viable in resolving environmental problems, because it 
focuses on solutions to these problems in a participatory fashion through involving 
and legitimizing affected parties. Healey firmly treats collaborative planning as a 
policy-driven approach, while promoting “new directions in governance mode which 
are more sensitive to the ‘consumers’ of public policy rather than the government 
‘producers’ of policy” (Healey, 1997: 205). She also builds on the realization that 
knowledge and value of these ‘consumers’ of public policy are constituted through 
social, interactive processes, such as processes of mediation, negotiation and 
consensus building. In this sense, in the collaborative planning approach, “public 
policy, and hence planning, are thus social processes through which ways of thinking, 




All in all, collaborative planning – as a policy-driven form of environmental 
governance – transcends traditional emphases in planning theory on instrumental 
reason and scientific knowledge. It better understands how people actually think and 
value in its social context and how public policies are developed and implemented by 
means of participation in a more interactive process. However, this planning approach 
is challenged by the neo-liberal mode of governance that has affirmed instrumental 
rationality within microeconomics, relinquishing hope of coordinating public policies 
and leaving it to function through market processes and particular elite groups. Based 
on what China is experiencing with “emerging neoliberal urbanism” (He & Wu, 2009), 
I query whether China’s environmental planning processes show any tendency to 
become the neo-liberal mode of governance in urban China. I am also interested in 
figuring out why or why not both two planning approaches (especially the 
collaborative planning approach) can find a place in urban ecological planning 
projects in the Chinese context. As a matter of fact in my empirical study part, 
CHAPTER FIVE, the abovementioned inquiries are core issues I will explore further 
in the discussion about whether urban ecological planning is a promising form of 








Chapter 3 – Contested Environmental Governance Regimes in 
Nanjing 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In contrast to western environmental governance regimes that were set up 
through grassroots initiatives, the state/government has long played a leading role in 
establishing and implementing these regimes in China. In 1979, the 16th article of 
Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China was passed, stating 
that ‘local people's governments at various levels shall be responsible for the 
environment quality of areas under their jurisdiction and take measures to improve the 
environment quality’. This was in response to the poor market allocation of 
environmental resources since China’s economic reforms in 1978. Coupled with the 
government legislation, market failures in environmental resource allocation led to a 
huge dependence of both public individuals and groups on governmental forces to 
resolve environmental governance problems. In addition, environmental spillover 
effects across regions required the state’s macroscopic perspective to collaborate 
between different levels of governments to act practically and coordinate conflicts of 
regions. All of the abovementioned arguably display some forms of authoritarian 
environmentalism and governance in China. Going back to the conceptual framework, 
the concept of ‘authoritarian environmentalism’ thus addresses the notion of social 
environmentalism under the Ecological Modernization theory. The lesson social 
environmentalism has taught us is to rethink power and its democratization process 
45 
 
and to examine whether existing power relationships between state and society are 
conducive for promoting sustainable development in different contexts of the world. 
More specifically, the Chinese state is very accustomed to providing legal regulations 
and making policies for the public to abide by. In doing so, the state not only prevents 
individuals from damaging the environment but also further regulates the society with 
consideration of the whole population at large. As shown in Chapter two, these 
observations strengthen the arguments about ‘pastoral power’ and ‘bio-politics’ as a 
top-down process of environmental governance in China. Indeed, the trajectory of the 
‘governmentalization of the state’ in environmental governance in China is arguably 
distinct from other countries in the world. In this sense, under such strong 
governmental presence in environmental resource allocation, designing strong and 
efficient regimes in issues of environmental governance is an essential component of 
China’s environmental policy. 
As matter of a fact, ‘good institutions beget good governance. It follows that 
good governance begets successful economic development while it also begets good 
democracy, as both successful economic development and sustainable democracy 
depend on good institutions’ (North, cited in Wong 2010: 37). Therefore, the 
successful establishment of environmental governance regimes is a precondition not 
only for satisfactory result of overall ‘good governance’ but also for the realization of 
goals in the development trajectory towards the ‘ecological modernization’ of a city. 
In fact, it is often only under scientific and rational environmental governance 
regimes that different sorts of environmental protection measures can be implemented 
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successfully and smoothly. However, on the contrary, without the guarantee on good 
regimes, seeds of a vicious circle for environmental degradation are sowed.  
It is first necessary to clarify what is meant by ‘environmental governance 
regime’. According to the definition from Environment and Development Research 
Center of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2004: 338), it refers to ‘a government 
management system consisting of mutually related government agencies and its 
affiliated institutions (shi ye dan wei) that are relevant to environmental protection. 
These organizations perform their functions in terms of legal backing and 
administrative authorization. The system is operated by these organizations in certain 
ways to reach the objectives of environmental protection’. 30 years after China’s 
economic reform, it has also been actively adapting its environmental regimes. 
Environmental governance regimes in Nanjing and urban China more broadly are 
divided into two categories: horizontal cooperation regime and vertical accountability 
regime among related government agencies (see also Li, 2008). Even though current 
environmental governance regimes in Nanjing allow for good environmental 
protection, in this chapter, I will concentrate on teasing out some problems and flaws 
of these contested regimes in Nanjing which impede the development progress of 
good environmental governance and ecological modernization, both horizontally and 
vertically.  
In the case of the contested horizontal cooperation regime, an effective regime 
has been hard to forge in Nanjing due to three reasons. Firstly, the position of Nanjing 
Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) is still low among all government agencies 
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in Nanjing and thus lacks the capabilities to coordinate with other organizations to 
resolve environmental issues together. Secondly, the ‘selfish departmentalism’ – a 
phrase that is put forward by Howell (2004) as one China’s governance pathology – of 
related government agencies drive these organizations to duck out of responsibilities, 
jockey for power and wrangle with each other in environmental governance process in 
Nanjing. Thirdly, internal functional conflicts within related government agencies (see 
also Fan, 2010) have also brought about a lot of institutional stress and strains on the 
formation of horizontal cooperation regime in environmental governance in Nanjing 
(Figure 7).  
In the other case of the contested vertical accountability regime, there are 
unbalanced distributions in the authoritative rights of the related government agencies 
and their environmental responsibilities. On the one hand, professional environmental 
protection resources are over-centralized in the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MOEP) of PRC and on the other, local environmental protection bureaus (especially 
at municipal and district or county levels) in Nanjing are lacking in executive power 
to contribute to environmental protection industries because of their confined political 
space that prevent their voices from being heard (Figure 8). Taking into account these 
issues in contested environmental governance regimes in Nanjing, I conclude this 
chapter by advising governments to take action to accelerate the progress of greening 







Figure 7 – Issues of contested horizontal cooperation regime in environmental 





Figure 8 – Issues of contested vertical accountability regime in environmental 
governance in Nanjing 
 
3.2 Contested Horizontal Cooperation Regime among Government Agencies in 
Nanjing 
Generally speaking, environmental protection work in Nanjing is wide-ranging, 
complicated, comprehensive and trans-regional. In view of these characteristics, 
Nanjing Municipal Government (NMG) stresses the centralized management mode 
with Nanjing Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) being in charge of all general 
environmental problems in the city while other related government agencies continue 
to be responsible for collective environmental supervision and management as well. 
These are basic ideas that many city governments adhere to in environmental 
protection in urban China. After all, it is only when the NEPB and other government 
agencies work collaboratively can there be an excellent division and coordination 
work system. This approach allows the exchange of technical know-how and 
environmental expertise across different agencies, which helps to foster better urban 
environmental governance in general. 
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In total, there are 15 to 20 government agencies in charge of dealing with 
different environmental pollution problems in Nanjing. This work system, based on a 
clear division of labor for environmental protection affairs, is conducive to a balance 
of rights and obligations within departments. The unity of rights and obligations 
indicates that one department which is endowed with examination and approval rights 
for the use of resources must take supervision and regulation responsibilities for 
environmental consequences after using these resources. At the same time, it also 
makes sense to construct an Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) for centralized 
management because it is beneficial for enhancing administrative efficiency and 
avoiding high administrative cost as examination and approval rights and supervision 
and regulation responsibilities are decentralized to localized government agencies. 
However, here arises a question: How can we coordinate these relationships among 
these relevant government agencies in environmental governance in Nanjing? As a 
leading body of government system for environmental protection, the NEPB is 
duty-bound to enable functional departments to work together to manage 
environmental crises. But in reality, effective horizontal cooperation regime among 
related functional departments in the NMG has been difficult to forge. Like a tripod, 
the reasons why the horizontal regime has failed are due to three legs:  
Firstly, although the status of the NEPB has been gradually rising in recent 
years, its rank position is still low relative to other government agencies in Nanjing. 
Hence, it lacks the capabilities to develop a coordinated approach that involves all 
related government agencies in environmental protection industries. To use serious 
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particle pollution on construction sites of Nanjing in recent years as an example, it is 
obvious that dust pollution is the dereliction of duty by construction and urban 
planning agencies in Nanjing. The NEPB should have exercised its administrative 
power to enforce measures on related agencies to rectify the polluted situation. 
However, despite being entitled to admonish government agencies for allowing 
environmental pollution to happen, its weak enforcement power led to it having to 
watch helplessly as the environmental situation deteriorated. Chief Xu from the 
Publicity and Education Center of NEPB) explains: 
 
“NEPB is a marginalized agency among all components of Nanjing 
Municipal Government, as it does not contribute any GDP to the 
government … It has no rights to punish these construction sites as the 
right to rectification is given to construction and urban planning 
agencies by the NMG. Therefore, legally, the NEPB cannot govern and 
rule these areas of dust pollution. (Xu, the chief of the Publicity and 
Education Center of NEPB, interviewed in 12 January 2011)”  
 
In view of this, it is not difficult to conclude that the NEPB has limited influence on 
other related government agencies, especially departments directly linked with 
economic development. Moreover, after several failed attempts at coordination, 
NEPB is likely to have a negative attitude towards collaborative supervision and 
regulation and thus narrow its scope of activities so that it is no longer necessary to 
cooperate with other government agencies for environmental governance. 
Secondly, government agencies in carrying out environmental protection in 
Nanjing have a tendency towards selfish departmentalism. In other words, 
deep-seated departmental self-interest in Chinese governmental regimes spurs each 
department to consider itself as the most important and thus seek to maximize its own 
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departmental profits. As a result, different government agencies end up in a scramble 
for power and wealth. If the business they handle is unprofitable, they tend to shirk 
responsibility and shift the blame onto others. Hence, efforts of the NEPB to 
comprehensively supervise and regulate environmental issues of these departments 
have been in vain. An interesting example brought up by Chief Zhang of the 
Supervision and Regulation Center for Automobile Pollution in Nanjing during our 
interview should be specified here. This lends much credence to the second critique of 
horizontal co-operation between governmental agencies in Nanjing. In accordance 
with state regulations in China, automobiles can be driven on the road after they have 
passed two examinations for safety and environmental protection. Both examinations 
used to be conducted by the Nanjing Public Security Bureau (NPSB). However, the 
NPSB has since shifted this responsibility to the NEPB, thus resulting in a flash point 
for endless dispute and even physical conflicts between both two agencies. In the 
process of their mutual shirking and shifting of responsibility, many vehicles end up 
not undergoing the environmental impact assessment (EIA) test during the annual 
security test with the NPSB. Eventually, these automobiles without a certified 
statement after the EIA test may be fined by the NPSB. Generally, when monetary 
profit is involved, conflict between both government agencies often intensifies unless 
there is political intervention. While this may be a unique case of Nanjing, selfish 
departmentalism continues to exist in many government agencies in urban China 
driving them to duck out of responsibility, to jockey for power and to think only of the 
interests of their own units, thus sabotaging chances of the formation of a successful 
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horizontal cooperation regime in environmental governance in urban China.  
Thirdly, internal functional conflicts of related government agencies in 
environmental governance in Nanjing have also brought about a lot of institutional 
stress and strains on the formation of horizontal cooperation, mutual supervision and a 
regulation work system. Specifically, these internal functional conflicts not only 
render related agencies willing to implement functions of administrative examination 
and approval (economic management functions), but also make them give up on 
performing their own functions of supervision and regulation (environmental 
management functions) (Table 2). Under the China’s administrative content, financial 
incentives to perform economic management functions far outweigh those of the 
environmental management functions in the various government agencies. In fact, 
administrative nonfeasance (a phrase that refers to the deliberate neglect of 
performing environmental management functions by government agencies) 
exacerbates selfish departmentalism, eventually causing the government to be ‘out of 
order’ in environmental governance. A possible solution to prevent such ‘government 
failure’ is that more powerful policies should be set up by the NMG to encourage 
environmental management in relevant functional departments, and to limit their 
conducting of administrative examinations and approvals.  
 
Table 2 – Internal functional conflicts of related government agencies in Nanjing 
Internal Functional Conflicts of Related Government Agencies in Nanjing 
Organization Name Environmental Management Function Economic Management Function
Finance Administration 
Bureau 
Examination and approval of financial services 
related with environmental projects 
Capital examination and approval 
and funds transfer 
Urban Planning Bureau 
Provision of infrastructure for environmental 
protection 




Management on forest conservation, planting 
and protection on biodiversity 
Forest development 
Water Resource Bureau 
Control on soil erosion, quality of ground water, 
and watershed management 
Water conservancy construction 
and water resource development 
Meteorological Bureau Management on air quality 
Provision of meteorological 
information 
Land and Resource 
Bureau 
Management on mineral and marine resources, 
land reconversion, and land property right 
management 
Land use planning and examination 
and approval on certain lands 
Transportation Bureau 
Nanjing Environmental Protection Bureau and 
Transportation Bureau jointly take charge of 
controlling vehicle pollution, while the 
implementation work belongs to Public Security 
Bureau 
Vehicle driver training and tests on 
vehicles 
Public Health Bureau 
Monitoring on drinking water quality and 
relevant epidemic diseases 
Tests on water equipment 
Science and 
Technology Bureau 
Research on advanced environmental science 
and technology, and coordination among 
different environmental research plans in a city
Different kinds of technological 
development 
 
3.3 Contested Vertical Accountability Regime among Government Agencies in 
Nanjing 
All rights carry with them corresponding responsibilities. For government 
agencies, their responsibilities are both consequences they should bear and legal 
obligations they must fulfill upon exercising their rights. A regime that balances the 
relationships between rights and responsibilities of related government agencies is 
known as a vertical accountability regime. However, in the day-to-day practical 
situation of environmental governance in Nanjing, such a regime overlooks the 
significance of balanced distributions of the authoritative rights of the related 
government agencies and their environmental responsibilities. Ironically, under this 
regime, a department (e.g. NEPB) who undertakes more difficult environmental 
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governance tasks and assumes greater accountability has less rights and resources in 
tackling knotty environmental issues. Two important factors for such a situation are: 
first, professional environmental protection resources being over-centralized at the 
national level, and second, local environmental protection bureaus (especially at 
municipal and district or county levels) finding them hard to contribute to 
environmental protection industries because of confined political space provided by 
the NMG for their voices to be heard. Both reasons ultimately lead to unwanted 
outcomes that stand in the way of the development progress towards successful 
environmental governance and ecological modernization in a city. 
(1) Centralization of professional environmental protection resources in Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MOEP) of the PRC 
In the present-day political system in China, the central government has 
jurisdiction over all provincial, municipal and district or county-level governments 
who are subordinate to the central authority. This unidirectional management mode 
allows MOEP to issue a command or an instruction directly to environmental 
protection bureaus at lower levels by way of distributing official documents. This 
enables the intents and policies of the central government for environmental 
protection to be carried out by EPBs at lower levels. Through these local EPBs, 
MOEP should have an opportunity to be in contact with local governments over 
environmental protection matters. However, due to the rights on assignment of 
personnel and provision of funds in local EPBs being curbed locally, MOEP is 
inclined to impose controls on the provision of professional environmental protection 
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resources to prevent local EPBs (especially provincial EPBs) from becoming 
lobbyists to get more privileges for their own local governments. Once these 
resources (including material and non-material resources) are controlled by MOEP, 
this centralized authority becomes an authoritarian controller who thinks its status is 
superior to local EPBs, and is thus unwilling to discard its official airs to cooperate 
with local governments in environmental governance. As a result, when local EPBs 
request for more professional resources during their enforcement of existing laws and 
regulations on environmental problems, very few get any support from MOEP. It is 
only when serious environmental pollution accidents or abrupt environmental affairs 
have taken place will MOEP mobilize its resources (human, material, financial and 
informational resources are included) to support local EPBs in first preventing 
pollution accidents from deteriorating before moving to abate it as soon as possible. In 
addition, based on differing degrees of severity of these pollution accidents, MOEP 
will also carry out disciplinary actions on several officials in local EPBs and 
governments due to their gross misconduct. In a nutshell, the MOEP approach of 
‘centralization before serious environmental pollution events; and punishment 
afterwards’ is detrimental to the development progress of successful environmental 
governance and ecological modernization process in Nanjing and more broadly in 
urban China. 
(2) Confined political space for local Environmental Protection Bureaus (especially at 
municipal and district or county levels) 
The previous section has emphasized how local EPBs in urban China are highly 
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controlled and restricted by the centralized Ministry of Environmental Protection in 
their provision of professional environmental protection resources. In contrast, local 
EPBs have much more reliance on local governments “for virtually all their support, 
including their budgets, career advancement, number of personnel, and resources such 
as cars, office buildings, and employee housing” (Economy, 2004: 108).  During 
practical environmental protection work, if local governments continue to seek 
temporary economic development at the expense of the environment and resources, 
local EPBs will sink deeper into the mire where it is difficult for them to know 
whether to follow the instructions in environmental protection rules and laws or to 
yield to pressure from local governments. Under most circumstances, local EPBs will 
make some concessions because the leaders of these organizations are afraid of losing 
their jobs along with the financial budget of their organizations being cut by local 
governments. In discussing the vertical accountability regime in Nanjing between two 
interviewees and I, both interviewees mentioned that Nanjing environmental 
protection authorities (huan bao xi tong), including the NEPB at municipal level as 
well as district and county-level EPBs, have difficulty in carrying out environmental 
protection work due to dual pressures from both the National Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and NMG. Some local governmental officials from 
district-level EPBs are also being put in an even more awkward position as they can 
often only notify the National Ministry of Environmental Protection of local 
environmental issues by writing anonymous letters. Thus it can be seen that local 
EPBs (especially those at municipal and district or county levels) are circumscribed in 
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an impasse and their identity as a double lobbyist (both lobbying MOEP for 
professional environmental protection resources and lobbying municipal governments 
for real executive power) has resulted in them being confined to a very narrow 
political space to the detriment of their environmental protection activities. 
3.4 Greening Environmental Governance Regimes in Nanjing 
In the discussion so far, it must be stressed that one individual organization 
cannot take entire responsibility for the environmental governance process. Currently, 
what top-down environmental governance needs is persistent improvement and 
innovation within contested environmental governance regimes in both horizontal and 
vertical dimensions. Although the present effect of top-down environmental 
governance in Nanjing is far from satisfactory, there is high hope for successful 
environmental governance and the realization of goals in the process of ecological 
modernization in the near future if governments accelerate the progress of greening 
environmental governance regimes in Nanjing, and more broadly in urban China. To 
accelerate the progress of greening environmental governance regimes in Nanjing, all 
related political institutions should go through a process of ‘institutional learning’ - a 
fundamental part of Ecological Modernization theory – through which problematic 
environmental governance regimes can be internally changed to advance the overall 
objective of ecological modernization. In this vein of institutional learning, all 
government agencies (including provincial governments, municipal governments and 
other related departments) ought to first reflect on environmental implications of their 
own decisions and actions, that is to say, go through a process of ‘reflexive learning’ 
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(also a related concept of ‘institutional learning’ in Ecological Modernization theory) 
and then they should figure out how rights and responsibilities are more properly 
distributed to different related agencies for better environmental governance. 
Horizontally, in order to deepen communication and collaboration among 
related government agencies in environmental governance, NMG should first upgrade 
the position of NEPB to a higher level in the ranks of all government agencies even as 
NEPB should be encouraged to play a more active role in the various processes of 
comprehensive decision-making in the government. Consequently, this will allow 
NEPB to turn into a key organization with enough clout both to get other relevant 
government agencies to respond to its directives, as well as to persuade them to 
engage in cooperative activities in the environmental governance process. Secondly, 
the NMG should set up an Environment and Resource Coordination Committee, 
which should be chaired by one deputy mayor of Nanjing as to enhance its 
administrative authority. The main focus of the committee should be to mitigate 
potential conflicts among related government agencies in environmental governance, 
and to prevent these agencies from struggling for power and backing out of 
responsibilities. Lastly, the NMG should put forth some stipulations that related 
agencies have to keep to, with the intention of urging functional departments to 
prioritize environmental management over economic management in environmental 
governance. 
On the other hand, despite the contested vertical accountability regime in 
Nanjing, the MOEP and the Environmental Protection Department of Jiangsu 
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Province have made some far-reaching reforms that have helped to improve law 
enforcement in environmental governance. For example, from 2006, MOEP has had 
the right to nominate a suitable person for a director of a local EPB before a local 
government’s appointment is finalized. Therefore, in theory, the chief executive 
position of a local EPB will never be totally controlled by its local government. In the 
same year, MOEP also founded five environmental supervision centers in five cities in 
the eastern (Nanjing), southern (Guangzhou), northwestern (Xi’an), southwestern 
(Chengdu) and northeastern (Shenyang) parts of China, with each center conducting 
vertical management on several local EPBs within its jurisdiction. Aimed at targeting 
at major environmental problems and the illegal practices of EPBs at local level, these 
centers report such issues immediately, directly and factually to the MOEP. By the 
same token, Environmental Protection Department of Jiangsu Province has adapted 
the vertical management mode at the national level and has similarly established three 
environmental supervision centers in Southern, Central and Northern Jiangsu 
respectively. The advantage of this vertical management mode lies in the capabilities 
of specialized divisions within a larger organization playing a supervisory role in 
overseeing both local EPBs and local governments, which results in less interference 
by local governments in law enforcement in environmental governance.  
In addition to these encouraging changes, the thesis wishes to reexamine the 
power of provincial governments in environmental governance and to propose a novel 
approach to improve the vertical accountability regime in urban China. This approach 
involves the delegation of administrative power from the MOEP to provincial 
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governments to give them greater autonomy. After such an authorization, provincial 
governments, similar to the MOEP, can better implement formulated policies and 
related environmental protection rules and laws due to their familiarity with the 
natural and human environment within their jurisdiction.  
However, the question then is how to monitor whether this delegation has 
succeeded in its expected goals. It appears that communication and information flow 
between the MOEP and provincial governments is a cardinal factor that can make or 
break the outcome of such a delegation. The MOEP must make clear its views on 
expected environmental governance effects to the various provincial governments. It 
also has to distinguish the minimum national environmental standards a province 
must achieve. In addition, resource-abundant regions with greater capacities should 
set their own environmental standards beyond these minimum standards. Once the 
standards are established, provincial governments should keep MOEP informed of 
their policy outputs and outcomes. Policy outputs are actions taken in pursuance of 
policy decisions; they come first and are more tangible. Policy outcomes focus on a 
policy's societal consequences after the policy has been implemented. While the ideal 
relationship between the MOEP and provincial governments ought to be a mutual 
supervision relationship at a horizontal level, its relationship has unfortunately 
become a vertical relationship under China’s strong centralized management system. 
According to Alter and Hage’s (1993: 210) empirical study, “when local networks 
were controlled to a large extent by hierarchical forces, there was likely to be a high 
level of dissatisfaction with performance” of organizations at different scales. This 
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observation further justifies the necessity for the process of delegation which will 
definitely improve the organizations’ performance in environmental governance by 
constructing an interactive platform on which the MOEP and provincial governments 
can communicate with each other on an equal footing. In addition, upon given 
authorization, provincial governments are empowered to substitute for municipal 
governments in carrying out vertical management of municipal EPBs. As such, local 
EPBs will no longer be bound by municipal governments as it will be the provincial 
governments who will provide human resources and funds instead, allowing them to 
use their power more freely and autonomously in environmental governance activities. 
This vertical management relationship between provincial governments and municipal 
EPBs will allow the latter to hold real power in their hands and get rid of their age-old 
predicament of being under the ‘dual leadership’ (i.e. being led by both MOEP and 
municipal governments) of the government work system in urban China. 
From the analysis above on the contested issues in environmental governance 
regimes in Nanjing and broadly in urban China, we become aware that the 
government does not have the adequate resources and capabilities to act alone in 
accomplishing environmental governance goals. Faced with ever-changing 
environmental issues and increasingly diversified public demands, environmental 
governance must draw support from resources and forces of multiple subjects. Among 
others, citizens from the civil society and experts from several professional agencies 
related with environmental protection should add their weight to the facilitation of 
processes of environmental governance and ecological modernization in a city. 
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Drawing on the ‘Governance Theory’ previously discussed in Chapter 2, I have 
realized the significance of a network-based environmental governance model (Zhu, 
2004). This model is a revolutionary new way of governance that shows a sharp 
contrast with the government-led environmental governance approach and underlines 
the importance of coordination and collaboration between government and other 
subjects. To actualize the objectives of ecological environmental governance, however, 
it is not just the government that should be connected with other subjects. Rather, all 
participatory subjects should form into a network with many multi-lateral ties where 
different interplaying subjects are correlative dependence. That being said, it is likely 
that for a long time to come that government will remain irreplaceable in China’s 
environmental governance network. As Chinese scholar Zhu (2004) has said, “under 
China’s bureaucratic governmental system, the role of the government is like that of a 
‘gatekeeper’ who can determine which forces can be permitted to participate in the 
environmental governance process while excluding others; however, in China’s newly 
emerging environmental governance network, the government plays a role instead as 
a ‘gateway’ among different subjects in the network and it is through this ‘pivot’ that 
subjects can link with each other to a greater or lesser extent. Nevertheless, a basic 
duty of governments in the world is to construct a variety of governance networks for 
societies [P. 9, my translation]”. 
Moving on to Chapter Four, this thesis will probe into the limitations of citizen 
participation in this initially formed environmental governance network in urban 
China. Drawing on my empirical study in Nanjing, the thesis will also identify issues 
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of Nanjing citizens’ participation in environmental governance activities, analyze 
some contributing factors that are causing these issues, and eventually propose some 
constructive resolving measures to improve the mechanisms of citizen participation in 










Chapter 4 – Limitations of Citizen Participation in Environmental 
Governance in Nanjing 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Given the failure of a traditional government-led environmental management 
pattern in Nanjing as elaborated in Chapter 3, what cities need is a modern 
environmental governance mode that places a high regard on citizen participation. 
Without participation and support from its citizens, it is impossible for any Chinese 
city to succeed in making ecological conservation and construction a reality. Citizen 
participation in urban environmental governance functions in three ways: 1) citizen 
participation can compensate for ‘government failure’ in dealing with environmental 
issues, 2) citizen participation provides a practical approach for citizens to express 
their desire for environmental protection and claim their environmental rights, and 3) 
citizen participation can boost social justice and harmony. In view of these functions, 
it is not difficult to justify citizen participation as a social approach to environmental 
issues in the interest of social justice and social equity.  
Generally, in western developed countries, the range, procedures and 
approaches to citizen participation in urban environmental governance accompanied 
with a citizen participation law system are growing in excellence, thus allowing these 
countries to gradually step out of the shadow of environmental pollution. However, 
because the Chinese state is still largely concerned with establishing and 
implementing contested environmental governance regimes, the forging of a civil 
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society in urban China will be a great challenge for a long time to come. Given such a 
situation, it makes more practical sense to deliberate on the limitations of and 
improvements to the present mechanisms for citizen participation in urban China, than 
to daydream about building an ideal civil society that is far beyond our reach.  
Improving on the current limitations of the citizen participation mechanism in 
cities will have a direct bearing on our environmental destiny in urban China. Chapter 
4 first illustrates briefly the current mechanisms of citizen participation in 
environmental governance in urban China. Moving on, it uses an empirical study on 
citizen participation in environmental governance in Nanjing to propound four main 
limitations of citizen participation that are also common in the rest of urban China. 
These problems are: 1) citizen participation being led mainly by the government in 
the urban environmental governance process, 2) the limited scope and depth of citizen 
participation in urban environmental governance, 3) restrictions on the ways in which 
citizens can participate in urban environmental governance, and 4), the total effect of 
citizen participation in urban environmental governance being far from being 
satisfactory. Given these problems, I believe that the limited citizen participation in 
Nanjing and broadly in urban China is a result of both subjective and objective factors. 
Subjectively, citizens rely too much on the government and are devoid of an inherent 
driving force in the citizen participation process. Objectively, the legal framework for 
citizens to participate in related environmental governance activities is immature even 
as the cost of collecting useful inputs by citizens during their participation in relevant 
environmental governance activities is very high. Moreover, approaches to citizen 
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participation are insufficient, leading to difficulty of access to citizenry participation 
in urban environmental governance even if one is willing. Finally, having examined 
the above, this chapter concludes with some new thoughts on citizen participation and 
advances some measures which governments should think deeply about to improve 
the mechanisms for citizen participation in environmental governance in urban China. 
4.2 Aspects and Ways of Citizen Participation in Urban Environmental 
Governance 
4.2.1 Aspects of Citizen Participation in Urban Environmental Governance 
Citizen participation in environmental governance in urban China consists of 
four aspects: 1) participation in the legislative process, 2) participation in the 
administrative decision-making process, 3) participation in the supervision process 
and 4) participation with citizens’ individual behaviors. All of these aspects of citizen 
participation in urban China prove the point on diffusion of power to the grassroots in 
environmental governance which I have examined under the second dimension of 
Governance theory – bottom-up environmental governance by the civil society – in 
Chapter 2. 
There are two forms of citizen participation in the legislative process in urban 
environmental governance. One form is characterized by electing representatives from 
citizens to participate in the legislative process, while the other form involves 
conducting public hearings during the process of lawmaking. The former requires 
participation by National People’s Congress deputies, members of Chinese People's 
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Political Consultative Conference and other experts, and thus the degree of expertise 
required for this participation is very high. On the other hand, the latter is a more 
direct form of citizen participation that more lay individuals can get involved in. 
Citizen participation is extremely crucial in the formulation of environmental 
legislation as the extent and depth of citizen participation can and will exert a 
tremendous influence on both the rationality and impartiality of environmental 
protection laws and their enforcements. 
Citizen participation in the administrative decision-making process related to 
environmental protection can allow government policies to be more comprehensive 
and democratic. Participating in an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the 
primary way in which citizens can participate in the administrative decision-making 
process in environmental governance in urban China. Liu (2010: 5-10) clearly defines 
EIA as “a process of prediction and evaluation of the possible positive and negative 
environmental impacts a project will have before construction, in the process of 
construction, and upon completion.” Citizen participation in an administrative 
decision-making process such as the EIA system will allow more concerns to be made 
and addressed during the whole EIA process. Moreover, citizen participation can help 
to alleviate authoritative abuses of power in the decision-making process, as well as 
enhance the preventative function of the EIA in minimizing the negative impacts 
some construction projects may have on the environment. 
Citizen participation in the environmental supervision process is yet another 
one of the four aspects of citizen participation in environmental governance in urban 
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China. Vis-à-vis the government, environmental information can be received by 
citizens as a whole in a much broader range and in a more direct way. While the 
government alone may be ineffective in dealing with environmental governance 
issues due to it receiving incomplete environmental information, citizen participation 
in the environmental supervision process can overcome such issues. Concretely, 
citizen participation in the environmental supervision process is not only about 
supervising destructive environmental behaviors but also involves monitoring of the 
enforcement of environmental laws. During the environmental supervision process on 
law enforcement, citizen participation can effectively prevent the conspiracy of 
silence that conceals the damage of the environment by both governments and 
enterprises. Ultimately, citizenry participation can circumvent many of the limitations 
associated with ‘government failure’ for the realization of successful environment 
governance and goals in the process of ecological modernization in urban China. 
Referring back to discussion around governmentality under governance theory, 
governmentality is also a way in which subjects can “act on themselves to produce 
particular bodily habits and attitudes to the self” (Huxley, 2008: 1635). 
Conceptualizing governmentality as an individualized scale of self-governance 
renders individual citizenry participation an important necessity in environmental 
governance in urban China. Such modes of self-governance have far-reaching 
environmental implications in urban environmental governance. China has become 
increasingly aware of the serious environmental damage that over-extensive economic 
growth can cause. As a result, it has firmly insisted that a long-term green revolution 
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on industries is crucial to the realization of goals in the Chinese ecological 
modernization process. I therefore argue that such civic green movements such as 
choosing green lifestyles and taking part in specific environmental conservation 
programs do play a significant role in environmental governance in urban China. 
4.2.2 Ways of Citizen Participation in Urban Environmental Governance 
There are two angles for us to look at citizen participation in environmental 
governance in urban China. Mainly, the approaches to and motivations behind 
participation. Approaches to citizen participation can be categorized as either direct or 
indirect citizen participation, while the motivations behind participation comprise of 
either active or passive citizen participation. 
In the case of the former, direct citizen participation refers to acts whereby 
citizens as individuals directly involve themselves in related environmental 
governance activities within which they can freely express their ideas, wishes and 
suggestions. Such direct citizen participation covers a variety of specific participative 
approaches such as voting, participating in a public hearing, participating in the EIA 
system, doing surveys and interviews, consulting with an expert, negotiating in a 
meeting, complaining by letter and visits, sending a petition, participating in 
administrative litigation, among others. On the other hand, indirect citizen 
participation has been depicted as a participation process in which citizens as 
individuals take part in different sorts of environmental governance activities through 
indirect channels. Through these indirect channels, citizens can enable their personal 
opinions, wishes and suggestions for a good outcome of environmental governance to 
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be heard. This includes participation via education and research institutes, citizen 
participation via their working units, citizen participation via Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and citizen participation via the mass media. 
In the case of the latter, active citizen participation means that citizens have the 
capabilities to carry out positive actions in environmental protection work. This 
includes offering comments and suggestions to governments for addressing relevant 
environmental governance issues, volunteering in environmental governance activities, 
reporting illegal actions that are against environmental protection laws to 
corresponding government agencies, selecting a green lifestyle. I argue that active 
citizen participation is a higher-level form of participation in contrast to passive 
citizen participation where citizens are driven by outside forces to participate in 
environmental governance. Typical situations of passive participation include 
situations where polluters are coerced to accept redress from the government on 
pollutants they have produced and feel compelled to take the necessary actions 
towards environmental governance under pressure from the media. Some real-life 
case studies include situations where enterprises are tagged as ‘black’ ones (which 
represent the most polluted companies in China), thus resulting in their owners having 
to carry out pollution control work because they are blacklisted and subject to the 
strictest supervision from related departments of law enforcement. Additionally, for 
fear of being charged costly fines, most urban inhabitants in China have no choice but 
to discard rubbish at some designated places. Passive citizen participation can also be 
seen as ‘ill-informed citizen participation’ (Tian, 2005) caused by the improper stance 
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the government has on the promotion of citizen participation. To clarify this concept, I 
will first note that the act of some urban governments to keep citizens informed of 
merely only the general objects of an environmental protection project rather than its 
details is very problematic. Besides this questionable rationale of the government, I 
also suggest that participative approaches adopted by governments are very often also 
channels through which governments can green-wash projects for public consumption. 
It is also highly ironic that certain governments rarely notify the public of an 
incoming participative approach beforehand and neither do they allow sufficient time 
for participants to voice their opinions during the participation process. All these 
points suggest that passive citizen participation is just like an empty shell, one that is 
useless in facilitating effective citizen participation in environmental governance in 
urban China.  
4.3 An Analysis of the Limitations of Citizen Participation in Environmental 
Governance in Nanjing 
4.3.1 Present Status of Citizen Participation in Environmental Governance in 
Nanjing 
Even as citizens are playing an increasingly significant role in environmental 
governance in urban China, the surveys I conducted in Nanjing suggest that the 
overall level of citizen participation in Nanjing is still fairly low and there remains 
some issues that merit further discussion. 
(1) Citizen participation in environmental governance in Nanjing demonstrates an 
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‘over-dependence on the government’ (Figure 9). 245 out of 330 survey 
participants (74%) consider that the government is the most important driving 
force in environmental governance in Nanjing, while only 15% and 3% 
respondents hold that the most powerful driving force is from citizens and NGOs. 
In addition, inference from the surveys indicates that although Nanjing citizens 
possess a certain level of environmental protection awareness and willingness, 
such awareness and willingness are to some extent divorced from their practical 
environmental protection behaviors (Figures 10-12). Only 55 survey participants 
(17%) have participated in related environmental governance activities in recent 
six months in Nanjing, and up to 90 of them (close to 27%) have never 
participated in environmental governance activity in Nanjing before.  
 
Figure 9 – Citizens’ opinions on the most important force in environmental 













Figure 11 – Citizens’ willingness to participate in a specific environmental 
governance activity in Nanjing 
 
 




(2) The scope and depth of citizen participation in environmental governance in 
Nanjing is quite limited. According to a simple process of deduction, we can 
figure out that among totally 240 (330-90=240) survey participants with previous 
citizen participation experiences, 220 respondents (92% of the 240) chose to 
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participate through their own individual behaviors rather than getting involved in 
the environmental legislative, administrative decision-making and supervision 
processes. Moreover, most citizens in Nanjing not only tend to participate in 
environmental governance activities only after environmental issues have 
occurred rather than engaging in environmental protection actions in advance; 
they are also more prone to be involved in some interests-related environmental 
governance activities within their neighborhoods rather than taking part in 
non-interests related activities at a larger scale. In this sense, citizen participation 
in environmental governance in Nanjing shows two features as ‘participation at 
the very end’ and ‘participation out of self-interest on a small scale’ (Figure 13). 
As a result, this kind of citizen participation exerts very limited influence on the 
formulation of public policies, thus leading to less impact on many of the 
decision-making and implementation processes of projects. 
 
Figure 13 – Citizens in Nanjing tent to participate in partial environmental 




(3) In view of citizens’ participative ways, Nanjing citizens’ participation in the 
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environmental governance process is restricted with most being indirect and 
passive processes of citizen participation. Many of the Nanjing citizens with 
previous participation experiences join relevant environmental governance 
activities through various indirect channels such as schools, workplaces, 
environmental NGOs (this channel seldom being used in Nanjing) together with 
the mass media. According to the statistical result of data provided by these 240 
‘experienced survey participants’, up to 183 citizens among them believe that their 
participative ways fall into a category of indirect citizen participation. 
Furthermore, due to a lack of self-motivation and enthusiasm, 187 out of 330 
participants (56%), including 90 survey participants who have never participated 
in any environmental governance activities before, can be classified as passive 
participants (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 – Most citizens in Nanjing tent to participate in environmental 
governance activities in an indirect and passive way 
 
 
(4) Although citizen participation has been encouraged in environmental governance 
practices in Nanjing recently (consider, for instance, the NMG holding an event in 
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2010 that allowed citizens to directly voice their critiques and propose advice to 
the state with government officials giving prompt responses through live telecast), 
the overall effect of citizen participation in Nanjing is far from satisfactory (Figure 
15). Many of the advantages of citizen participation are not fully realized and 
neither are the values of citizen participation being manifested. Indeed, this 
observation is not particular to Nanjing, with the holistic effectiveness of citizen 
participation in environmental governance processes in other parts of urban China 
also being subject to question (Song, 2004; Wang, 2008; Zhao, 2008; Chen, 2009). 
 
Figure 15 – Citizens’ opinions on the effectiveness of citizen participation in 
environmental governance in Nanjing 
 
 
4.3.2 A Causal Analysis of Issues of Citizen Participation in Environmental 
Governance in Nanjing and Broadly in Urban China 
Given the abovementioned problems, we need to go beyond simple 
explanations to see what some of the key factors are contributing to these issues. 
Upon analysis, I deem that the general low level of citizen participation in 
environmental governance in Nanjing and broadly in urban China is the result of both 
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subjective and objective factors. Subjectively, citizens overly lean on the government 
and lack an inherent driving force in the citizen participation process. From the 
objective stand, the legal framework is not well established for citizens to participate 
in environmental governance activities while the cost of collecting useful information 
from citizens involved in relevant environmental governance activities is 
considerably high. Moreover, many of the participative approaches adopted by the 
state are insufficient leading to limited citizenry access to the urban environmental 
governance process. 
(1) Over-dependence of citizens on the government in citizen participation 
As well known to many, China has had a very long history of a feudal society 
both in the ancient times and from 1949 to 1978 when China was a planned economy. 
During both periods of history, bureaucratic politics ensured an overwhelming 
political dominance by the state over domestic politics, a process that has engendered 
the psychological dependence of modern citizens on present-day Chinese 
governments thus resulting in inadequate citizen participation. This results in 
governments strengthening their own administrative capabilities, thus further 
widening the gap between citizens and governments and reinforcing the consistent 
dependence of citizens on governments. However, while almost all processes of 
citizen participation are under the control of governments in environmental 
governance in urban China, the viewpoints and stances each have on environmental 
governance issues may not be agreeable. Such inconsistencies cause governments to 
have an ambivalent attitude toward the promotion of citizen participation. On the one 
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hand, governments desire citizenry participation and propel this process forward for 
the sake of maximizing public interest. Yet, on the other hand, governments are afraid 
of citizen participation and even hinder it for fear that their self-interest will be 
damaged and their authority will be undermined. This is what I am going to 
emphasize as a limitation of ‘government-led citizen participation’ in environmental 
governance in urban China.  
The limitations of ‘government-led citizen participation’ can be seen in two 
main ways. The limitation is first manifested occasionally as an inner contradiction 
between higher-level and lower-level governments, with the former concentrating on 
large-scale public interests to promote citizen participation and the latter concerning 
with its own interests, thus resisting citizen participation processes. Secondly, the 
deeds of certain governments do not match up with their words when they are 
developing and improving citizen participation in environmental governance in urban 
China. Some Chinese governments merely stress the importance of citizen 
participation in both official documents and leaders’ public speech drafts. However, 
when putting the citizen participation into practice, they regard citizen participation as 
a content-less concept and as merely a thought-stopping slogan.  
Owning to the limitation of ‘government-led citizen participation’, citizens in 
urban China are usually only able to get limited access to information that 
governments have filtered and selected for them. In fact, this limitation is the most 
fundamental reason contributing to present issues of citizen participation by 




(2) A lack of inherent driving force of citizens in citizen participation  
Apart from the fact that ‘government-led citizen participation’ mode has 
dampened citizens’ enthusiasm for participating in the environmental governance 
process to a great extent, citizens are also unwilling to involve themselves actively 
and directly in related environmental governance activities due to instinctive 
selfishness and self-interest. To be specific, there are two types of motives for citizen 
participation in urban China, the first being one’s self-interest. This refers to both 
economic and social interests that together naturally motivate people to hanker after 
fame and gain. Based on a ‘cost-benefit analysis’, when citizens firmly believe that 
the costs they pay for are greater than the benefits they can obtain during their 
participation process, these ‘rational economic men’ (Hollis & Nell, 1975) who are in 
pursuance of maximizing their own benefits will not actively respond to and take any 
direct actions in this citizen participation process. In urban China’s context, due to the 
high costs involved in getting access to useful information about environmental 
governance issues, citizens are ‘wise’ enough to choose their preferred ways of 
passive participation in related environmental governance activities (see point four 
below). The second motivation behind citizen participation is one’s moral obligations. 
Similar to other cities on a similar trajectory towards ‘ecological modernization’, 
Chinese citizens should develop a strong sense of responsibility for environmental 
protection and also make some tangible contributions to the pathway of ecological 
modernization. However, in reality, a significant portion of citizens in urban China do 
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not possess any ideas of ecological civilization and thus fall short of expectations of 
participation in the environmental governance process. For example, when 
encountering an environmental issue, most Chinese citizens still stubbornly adhere to 
their general belief that people should mind their own business and stand aloof from 
things that are of no personal interest. Therefore, although they may find themselves 
confronted by environmental degradation, their mindset of ‘catching a free ride’ in the 
environmental governance process results in few extending their supports. It is well 
known that embracing advantages and circumventing disadvantages is the most 
instinctive motivation behind all human behavior without exception. Doubtlessly, the 
behaviors of citizens in the participation process are driven by this instinctive 
motivation as well. Against a background of fast paced economic development in 
urban China vis-à-vis motivation driven by moral obligations, self-interest can make 
citizens more prone to both participate only at the very last minute once 
environmental issues have been recurring, and participate merely in interests-related 
environmental governance activities that are held on a small scale. In short, because 
self-interest driven citizen participation will ultimately diminish the overall effect of 
citizen participation in environmental governance in urban China, there is an urgent 
need to establish a ‘necessary moral framework’ in the Chinese society (a conception 
used by Sarkar in 1999 to illustrate the importance of moral growth in a society 
towards ecological modernity) for a more satisfactory citizen participation model. 
(3) An immature legal framework for citizen participation 
A fully developed legal framework is the guarantee of citizen participation in 
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environmental governance in urban China. Although China has already stressed the 
significance of citizen participation for environmental protection in Environmental 
Protection Law of the PRC, and has also clarified principles of citizen participation in 
other laws and regulations (such as Law of the People's Republic of China on Urban 
and Rural Planning), rules in these laws and regulations are too abstract and 
inoperative as they lack further elaborations. In particular, detailed information of 
citizen participation (e.g. the contexts, the types, and the extent to which citizens can 
participate) is not specified in these legal documents. Lacking concrete and operable 
laws and regulations, many citizens will be confused about what and how courses of 
action to take in the citizen participation process. Furthermore, their enthusiasm for 
continuous participation and efforts to rope others into related environmental 
governance activities would gradually vanish into thin air. Without a more mature 
legal framework, citizen participation will continue to be a mere formality with 
limited positive effects on the urban environmental governance process.  
(4) The high cost of getting information in citizen participation  
Due to the incomplete knowledge they have on environmental protection, most 
citizens can only sense whether the environment is polluted or not, but can not get 
any specific information about existing environmental damage or its degree of 
severity. In contrast with citizens, polluting enterprises are aware of the possible 
pollutants that can be produced during the production process, the condition of 
discharging these pollutants and the degree of the damage of these pollutants. 
However, driven by economic interests, these polluting enterprises tend to withhold 
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such key information about environment pollution so that citizens are unable to have 
a concrete grasp of urban environmental pollution issues. At the same time, 
governments with a duty to disclose environmental information also often 
demonstrate a characteristic of the ‘rational economic man’ by ‘embracing advantages 
and circumventing disadvantages’. Caring more about their self-interest, governments 
only release environmental information to their own advantage and do not guarantee 
the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of the information they make public. In 
this sense, citizens are unable to fully enjoy their right to environmental information. 
In addition, in order to take polluters to task for the pollution they have caused, 
citizens have to cover the unnecessary high cost of collecting useful information 
which most of them cannot afford in the present environmental governance process in 
urban China. 
(5) Citizens’ participative approaches being insufficient and not easy to get access to  
Generally speaking, many survey participants in Nanjing possess a certain level 
of environmental protection awareness, with a stronger awareness among the more 
highly educated. However, they often find that their planned actions for participation 
difficult to materialize in practice. Two main reasons can be pinpointed: firstly, there 
are limited practical and effective participative approaches provided for citizen 
participation in environmental governance in urban China. Secondly, participative 
approaches that already exist are not easy to get access to as well (Figure 16). Survey 
participants, thick on the ground, consider ‘voting’, ‘participating in a public hearing’ 
and ‘participating in the EIA system’ as three very effective participative approaches 
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in the environmental governance process. However, in Nanjing, there are very few 
citizens who have experience in using these three participative approaches (Figure 
17). It appears that if governments provided sufficient and accessible participative 
approaches for citizens’ participation in environmental governance in urban China, 
citizens would take part in citizen participation by their own free will. However, 
given that both practical and effective citizens’ participative approaches are not 
adequate and not easy to get access to, most citizens have to relinquish their planned 
action for participation in environmental governance in urban China. 
 
Figure 16 – Citizens’ participative approaches being insufficient and not easy to 
get access to in environmental governance in Nanjing 
 
 
Figure 17 – Three effective citizens’ participative approaches in environmental 




4.4 Perfection of the Citizen Participation Mechanism in Urban Environmental 
Governance 
Given that ‘government-led citizen participation’ will persist for a long time in 
urban China coupled with the glaring limitations of citizen participation that have 
been teased out in the earlier analysis on Nanjing, governments (especially city 
governments) should undertake greater responsibility and obligation to empower 
citizens and civic participation process. The empowerment of individuals as 
suggested in the discussion on governance framework in Chapter will hopefully 
ensure a relatively more democratic environmental governance process and the 
realization of ‘ecological modernization’ goals in urban China.  
Firstly, governments should take the first step to improve the existing system of 
laws and regulations about citizen participation in environmental protection. Apart 
from further clarifying environmental rights and drawing a distinction between rights 
and duties of citizens, the improved legal system should also specify the specific 
aspects, approaches and procedures for citizens to participate in the environmental 
governance process. Indeed, this is a fundamental measure to solve a thorny issue – of 
present rules of citizen participation being inoperative – in environmental governance 
in urban China. Moreover, such a revamping of the legal system will also prevent 
relevant laws and regulations from becoming overly-formalistic or even impeding the 
implementation of citizen participation in environmental governance in urban China.  
Secondly, there is an urgent need for governments to establish and further 
improve on an Environmental Information Disclosure System. The “Regulation of the 
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People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information” was 
proclaimed by the State Council in 2008. It ascertains that environmental protection 
information is key information that should be publicized by governments. 
Nevertheless, ‘China’s sham government information disclosure regulation’ (Sheng, 
2009) still infringes on citizens’ environmental rights to know what specific potential 
environmental issues lurk in our cities like silent killers. It is therefore necessary for 
Chinese governments to increase the degree of disclosure for environmental 
information and further establish a more comprehensive Environmental Information 
Disclosure System. Furthermore, I argue it will be justifiable for Chinese 
governments to make a specialized Law of People’s Republic of China on the 
Disclosure of Environmental Information. Law-makers of this specialized law can 
better clarify the rights people have in obtaining information and making decisions 
during their dealing with environmental protection matters, as well as elaborate on 
detailed procedures for the disclosing of environmental information for better 
enforcement of this law as well. Once a comprehensive Environmental Information 
Disclosure System is built, the cost of citizen participation in environmental 
governance in urban China will greatly decrease and citizens can soon channel their 
passion for the environment into wholehearted citizenry participation.  
Thirdly, governments should continue to strengthen publicity and education on 
environmental protection issues in urban China. For example, Chinese governments 
should increase financial support, construct more infrastructural facilities (like 
building more environmental publicity and education centers) and train more 
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qualified personnel. In addition, Chinese governments should also enable this 
environmental publicity and education work to become institutionalized and 
regularized in order to enhance the environmental literacy of all citizens in a city. 
O’Neill (1996) of San Diego Earth Times explains:  
 
“The term ‘environmental literacy’ (EL) is used to describe an 
individual’s capacity to perceive and interpret the relative health of 
environmental systems and to take appropriate action to maintain, 
restore or improve the health of those systems. An individual who is 
environmentally literate possesses the following characteristics: 1) 
environmental knowledge; 2) environmental attitude and sensitivity; 3) 
problem solving, planning and collaborative/facilitative skills, action 
strategies and 4) the ability to take action to improve the 
environment.” 
 
Last but not least, to further reduce the cost of citizen participation in 
environmental governance in urban China, governments should optimize citizens’ 
participative approaches. On one hand, they should encourage citizens to more 
employ participative approaches such as “voting”, “a public hearing” and “the EIA 
system”. On the other hand, they ought to pave the way to let citizens’ voices be 
heard in the environmental legislative process, the environmental administrative 
decision-making process, and the environmental supervision process. In addition, 
Chinese governments should also draw heavily on the Internet as one direct and 
low-cost approach for citizens to use in their participation processes. Currently 
available citizen participation approaches on government websites such as online 
complaint centers, the mayor’s electronic mailbox, online surveys and virtual forums 
must be made the best use of by Chinese governments. At the same time, all 
reasonable suggestions brought forward by citizens by means of the Internet must be 
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handled and answered promptly by the governments as well. Only by doing so will 
the gap between governments and citizens in the citizen participation process be 
bridged. In the case of indirect participative approaches, Chinese governments should 
make the best use of existing indirect channels such as schools, working units and the 
mass media, while motivating citizens to participate in environmental governance in 
urban China through NGOs. In comparison with participating as an individual citizen, 
citizen participation via NGOs will deepen people’s understanding of environmental 
issues to a greater extent. Unfortunately, since there is no previous experience to fall 
back on, NGOs have to “wade across the stream by feeling the way,” (Mo Zhe Shi Tou 
Guo He, as we say in Chinese) as a mechanism of NGOs’ participation in 
environmental governance in urban China has yet to take shape. As a result, Chinese 
governments have to first identify NGOs as a ‘helpful allied force’ as well as another 
‘important environmental supervisor’ before offering them more open political space 
and a looser policy environment for their participation in future urban environmental 
governance processes in China.  
In summary, this chapter has used Nanjing as a case study to probe into 
limitations of another bottom-up approach to environmental governance through 
citizen participation. As I have argued, the overall level of citizen participation in 
environmental governance in Nanjing and broadly in urban China is still quite low. I 
have pinpointed some fundamental reasons contributing to the present limitations of 
citizen participation in environmental governance in Nanjing and broadly in urban 
China, while also putting forth some constructive measures to improve the 
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mechanisms for citizen participation as well. Moving on to Chapter 5, I will pay 
particular attention to a special group of citizens – experts (these experts here 
referring to urban planners, ecologists, botanists and etc.) who have professional 
knowledge and skills, examining how they use a third form of environmental 
governance, ‘urban ecological planning’, to resolve urban environmental issues. In 
the process of urban eco-planning in China, power struggles are very common in 
specific projects. Here, I point out two main contradictions that exist among 
stakeholders (including governments, experts and citizens): a contradiction between 
the governments’ planning intentions and experts’ planning ideology, and a 
contradiction between experts’ planning ideology and public opinion. Subsequently, I 
use the “Sino-Singapore Nanjing JXZ Eco High-tech Island” and “Migration of 
Nanjing’s Iconic Phoenix Trees for Subway Expansion Plan” projects as two case 
studies to examine how both ecological planning projects address the 
abovementioned contradictions. Finally, I will deliberate on how an urban ecological 
planning process can be treated as a promising form of environmental governance in 




Chapter 5 – Urban Ecological Planning: A Promising Form of 
Environmental Governance in Nanjing? 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Being acutely aware of the seriousness of urban environmental problems, the 
Chinese government has paid increasing attention to the sustainable growth of the 
Chinese economy. In order to achieve sustainable economic growth, there needs to be 
a transformation of the development model. During the transitional period of China’s 
economy in the 21st century, the central government’s announcement of building an 
ecologically civilized society with high productivity, improved quality of life and a 
beautiful environment signals a clear change of policy for eco-city development in 
many cities in China. The six eco-city embryonic plans richly exemplify China’s 
strong determination to practise what it preaches on eco-development. There are two 
reasons behind urban ecological planning as an approach to resolve environmental 
problems in urban China. Some scholars argue that one reason is no more than an 
environmental management countermeasure by the state, or in other words, a policy 
happening by default (Yang, 2010; cf. Zhu, 2009), while others believing urban (eco-) 
planning as a part of state’s strategies and tactics to balance the economic, social and 
environmental interrelations and ultimately to govern the economy and society in a 
city (Johnson, 1993; Pal, 1990; Reed, 1996; Tang, 2000). In a way both rationales 
behind Chinese eco-development mirror certain issues in the process of urban 
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ecological planning in China, such that Chinese urban (eco-) planning is the default 
rather than a choice, even as it is used to put the state-led development of space under 
control and to ultimately legitimatize urban economic growth as well. It thus can be 
said, following the proposition highlighted in Chapter 2 on environmental planning as 
a state policy-driven process, that the Chinese state continues to play a dominant role 
in influencing the urban ecological planning process in China. In addition, I contend 
that there remains many other unrevealed core issues to be studied further in some 
specific ecological planning projects in urban China.  
In this chapter, I focus on two ecological planning cases in Nanjing: the 
Sino-Singapore Nanjing JiangXinZhou (JXZ) Eco High-tech Island and the Migration 
of Nanjing’s Iconic Phoenix Trees for Subway Expansion Plan. In both cases, I 
exposit how three main bodies struggle with each other in urban (eco-) planning 
processes in Nanjing. These three main bodies are government officials who have 
always been major forces in the policy-making process and play an enduring role as 
decision-makers and general coordinators, experts (especially urban planners, 
ecologists, botanists, etc.) who are often seen as technicians or practitioners with 
special knowledge and skills, as well as ordinary citizens who seldom are able to 
shake off their unfair labels as ‘the ill-informed’ and ‘passive participants’ in planning 
projects in urban China. Regarding the first case of ‘Nanjing eco-island’, I tease out 
two contestations between the government and experts, and experts and citizens, 
reasoning out how and why both contradictions crop up and are intensified in this 
project’s planning process. Echoing what I have argued in Chapter 3 and 4, I argue 
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that the most fundamental reason behind both contradictions is that urban (eco-) 
planning is after all a technology of the government and a policy-driven approach to 
environmental governance in China. As for what reasons I find critical in the second 
case of ‘transplantation of phoenix trees’ in Nanjing, I argue that the changing role of 
experts from past technical professionals working for the government to skilled 
communicators between authorities and citizens is a feasible and effective way to 
mediate the abovementioned contradictions in the urban (eco-) planning process in 
China. As such, Chinese governments should be more open to alternative viewpoints 
from both experts and non-experts and undergo close self-examination over citizenry 
resistance to its plans as aided by the guidance and know-how of experts. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by proposing Healey’s (1997; 1998) collaborative planning as an 
integral part of environmental governance to realize good environmental governance 
and accelerate the progress of ecological modernization in Chinese cities of tomorrow. 
5.2 Sino-Singapore Nanjing JXZ Eco High-tech Island  
5.2.1 Project Introduction 
Sino-Singapore Nanjing JXZ Eco High-tech Island (hereinafter referred to as 
the Nanjing Eco Island) is a large-scale collaborative land development project 
between China and Singapore. Generally speaking, the transnational relationships 
between China and Singapore have always been friendly and cooperative. Since the 
establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Singapore in 1990, China and 
Singapore’s bilateral economic and trade relation has entered into a golden age in 
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which the trade figures have first risen steadily then rapidly, with it finally arriving at 
52.44 billion US dollars in 2008 (Zhang, 2009). It is conceivable that it is due to the 
main goals of mutual benefits in development and economic growth that both 
governments would collaborate to attract foreign direct investment to their own 
countries. However, the China-Singapore collaboration is not solely driven by the 
market economy; political and cultural factors also serve to improve ties (cf. Pereira, 
2003). Furthermore, collaborations between both countries are not restricted to 
economic development projects. Indeed, since the 21st century, a policy direction for 
bilateral collaboration has been geared towards ecological development. 
The Nanjing eco-island project is one key project of collaborative ecological 
development projects between China and Singapore. This project is located in the 
Jiangxinzhou Island in Yangtze River to the south-west of downtown Nanjing. The 15 
Km² Island falls in Jianye District and is only 6.5 kilometers away from the Central 
Business District of Nanjing (Figure 18). According to the conceptual master plan, 
existing wetland, farmland and green area on JXZ Island will be preserved and four 
functional zones will be built on the island for ecologically-themed education and 
recreation, urbanization, ecological parks and ecological conservation (Figure 19). 
Additionally, the objective of this plan is for both professionals and lay individuals to 
find Nanjing eco-island a more productive platform to work and a favorable place to 
live, a place which features environment friendliness, energy efficiency and other 
living amenities. All in all, “[t]he project is envisioned to render Jiangxinzhou a 
model for sustainable growth characterized by eco friendly designs and knowledge 
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industry development” (Lee Yi Shyan, 2009). 
 
Figure 18 – A bird-eye view of Sino-Singapore Nanjing JXZ Eco High-tech 
Island 
 























Figure 19 – Zoning in Nanjing eco-island  
 
[Source: Conceptual Master Plan of Singapore · Nanjing Eco High-tech Island (2010)] 
 
Although this plan is doubtless a crystallization of wisdom from both Chinese 
and Singaporean professionals, from signing a Cooperation Framework Agreement 
between Singapore and Jiangsu Province to the groundbreaking ceremony of this 
project and then to the completion of a conceptual master plan of this project (Table 
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3), I still find two controversial issues that merit further discussion in the planning 
process of this project. 
 
Table 3 – Some big events in the Nanjing eco-island project 
Time Some big events in the Nanjing eco-island project 
2008.11 Signing a Cooperation Framework Agreement between Singapore and Jiangsu Province 
2009.05 
The groundbreaking ceremony of the Nanjing eco-island project 
(Figures 20 & 21) & the establishment of Sino-Singapore 
Nanjing Eco High-tech Island Development Co., Ltd. 
2010.09 The completion of a conceptual master plan of the Nanjing eco-island project 
 
Figure 20 – A cornerstone laid after a ceremony for the project of Sino-Singapore 









Figure 21 – A leveled plot in early planning of the Nanjing eco-island project 
 
 
5.2.2 Controversial Issues in the Project 
1) Government’s Planning Intentions Being Incorporated into Experts’ Planning 
Ideology 
In the first place, one controversial issue I tease out from power struggles in the 
Nanjing eco-island project is that the government’s planning intentions are 
incorporated into experts’ (especially urban planners in this case) planning ideology. 
During the preparation phase of the ‘Nanjing eco-island’ project, the Nanjing 
Municipal Government had already known fairly well the basic directions and 
overarching aims of the project prior to it authorizing urban planners to produce the 
project’s master plan. According to my interviews with some government officials and 
experts who are familiar with this project, the overarching aim of this project is not 
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only to “draw on experience of urban development of Singapore to build a new 
version of Singapore-style garden city in Nanjing” (Tian, ecologist, interviewed in 17 
November 2010), but also to attract domestic and foreign investment for economic 
growth there (cf. Zhu, 2008; Pow & Neo, 2010). However, based on some 
background information of this project provided by an anonymous government 
official, the real rationale of constructing the Nanjing eco-island is also related with 
some issues of inter-urban competition for eco development.  
 
“As you may know, Jiangxinzhou in Nanjing once was the first choice 
for building an eco-city between China and Singapore at the national 
scale. However, after the central government in China considered 
regional equality and balanced development between the northern and 
the southern part of China, this national cooperative eco-city project 
was finally decided to be built in Tianjin, China. Surely, Nanjing 
Municipal Government was unwilling to lag behind and wanted to 
compete against Tianjin for eco-development, so through many rounds 
of bilateral negotiations Nanjing government finally came to a mutual 
agreement with the Singapore government to build an eco-island in 
Jiangxinzhou……” (Anonymous government official, interviewed in 8 
January 2011, Nanjing) 
 
Owing to these government’s development goals behind constructing an 
eco-island in Nanjing, some sort of conflict is bound to happen at one point or another 
between government officials and experts during the planning process of Nanjing 
eco-island. For example, with regard to a plan for external transportation system in 
this project, certain government officials in Nanjing were overhasty in making a 
decision of constructing two bridges and three tunnels to connect the isolated island 
with the rest of Nanjing within 3-5 years. However, in contrast, some experts 




“Ecologically speaking, an irrational transportation planning decision 
leads to many kinds of pollution in a project. With regard to the 
Nanjing eco-island case, if we expend too much effort on constructing 
external transportation facilities, the traffic flow between the island 
and Nanjing city areas will definitely be increased, which is 
disadvantageous for the protection of ecological environment on this 
island.” (Urban planner Wang, interviewed in 20 February 2011, 
Nanjing) 
 
“Now, the population of Jiangxinzhou just reaches 12,000, so I firmly 
believe it is unnecessary to build 2 bridges and 3 tunnels in merely 3-5 
years…To balance the development of the economy with environment 
protection is the central tension inherent in the Nanjing eco-island 
project.” (Prof. Han, interviewed in 09 February 2011, Nanjing) 
 
This conflict should have alerted the Nanjing city government to the possibility 
of future traffic problems in this planning area. However, it is unfortunate that the 
government merely utilized top-down approaches to resolve this conflict by first 
negotiating with these maverick experts on the basis of its superior authority, further 
dictating them to take action based on its intentions in this project preparation phase. 
As a result, despite these experts’ suggestions on transportation planning of this 
project being sincere, they were ultimately not accepted by the Nanjing Municipal 
Government. From the “Conceptual Master Plan of Singapore· Nanjing Eco High-tech 
Island” (2010: 65), a planning drawing (Figure 22) clearly shows the government’s 
intentions of connecting the planned eco-island with the rest of the city in a manner 
that overrules the experts’ environmental protection oriented planning ideology. In 
other words, the government’s planning intentions end up being incorporated into 




Figure 22 – External transportation system of the Sino-Singapore Nanjing JXZ 
Eco High-tech Island  
 
[Source: Conceptual Master Plan of Singapore · Nanjing Eco High-tech Island (2010)] 
 
2) Formalistic Citizen Participation in the Nanjing Eco-island Project 
Secondly, I argue the citizen participation in the Nanjing eco-island project is 
formalistic and tends to be a form of tokenism (by tokenism I mean that although the 
Nanjing citizens have chances to get involved in some formal citizen participation 
processes like exhibitions, symposiums but their advice may not be taken on board in 
the final stage of a planning process). This contention can be justified by some issues 
arising from citizen participation processes in this project. Before planning this 
project in May 2009, the Nanjing Municipal Government held a small symposium 
with the participation of some government officials, urban planners and citizen 
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representatives, in order to know some basic information of characteristics, existing 
problems and to gain suggestions for its future development. Certainly, this way of 
holding a symposium should have made citizens (especially these local inhabitants in 
the island) somewhat more likely to participate and play an advisory role in the 
planning process of this project. Ironically, most of these selected citizen 
representatives were actually administrative staff on Jiangxinzhou Island whose 
thoughts coincided with ideas of the Nanjing Municipal Government, and thus cannot 
completely represent the public opinion of all local islanders. In an interview with a 
governmental official Chen who has participated in this symposium, he told me that 
the participation of these administrative staffs in this small symposium expresses the 
willingness of local inhabitants in JXZ to embrace the upcoming eco-development 
project, emphasizing the wish of islanders to be connected with outside city life which 
fits in exactly with the government’s intention of building an external transportation 
system. However, interviews with some islanders (Figure 23) in the local community 
of JXZ revealed more worries and concerns over some negative aspects of the 
‘Nanjing eco-island’ project after they realize the real agenda of Nanjing government 
to construct 2 bridges and 3 tunnels between Nanjing city areas and the JXZ Island:  
 
“Birds were singing and skies were blue in the past time in JXZ; once 
these bridges and railway tunnels are built, I am afraid noises of motor 
vehicles will disturb the tranquility and the exhaust gas will pollute the 
clean air of the island.” (Xie, local resident in JXZ, interviewed in 18 
December 2009) 
 
“If improvement on inner transportation system on the island lags 
behind rapid development of external passageways, roads in the island 
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will be heavily congested and this could lead to a series of subsequent 
ecological problems.” (Wang, local resident in JXZ, interviewed in 18 
December 2009) 
 
Figure 23 – An interview between a local resident Xie and me in Jiangxinzhou on 
18 December 2009 
 
Contrasting actual public opinion from the grass roots with government’s 
planning intentions, I suggest that the objective to solicit public opinion is not reached 
in this formalistic process of ‘citizen participation before the planning’ at all. In fact, 
the purpose of this form of ‘citizen participation before the planning’ is solely for the 
government and experts (especially urban planners in this case) to collect useful 
information they are in need of.  
Unlike citizens being welcomed in the whole process of planning in developed 
countries, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Urban and Rural Planning 
states that results of an urban planning project must be made public by means of the 
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Internet, exhibition or the mass media after the completion of the master plan of the 
project. In this sense, Nanjing municipal government is obligated to publicize the 
completed conceptual master plan of the “Sino-Singapore Nanjing JXZ Eco High-tech 
Island” in any of these three ways. Admittedly, this so-called “citizen participation 
after the planning” does exert some positive influence on publicity of this project. 
However, due to the fact that the government and experts (especially urban planners 
in this case) in China disapprove of the citizens’ clout to determine the end product at 
the later planning stage, citizens’ suggestions and recommendations for revising 
formed plans will invariably fail to materialize. As such, citizen participation in urban 
ecological planning is still restricted to the levels of “participation after the planning” 
and “passive participation” in Nanjing and broadly in urban China. Referring to “a 
ladder of citizen participation” (Arnstein, 1969: 217; Figure 24), China’s citizen 
participation stays at levels of ‘Non-participation’ and ‘Tokenism’ in this ladder. The 
level of ‘Non-participation’ means a real objective of the Chinese government is not 
to enable citizens to participate in a planning program but to “enable power holders to 
‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the participants”. From the aspect of another level of tokenism in 
‘the ladder of citizen participation’, although the Chinese government has allowed 
have-nots citizens to hear and have a voice in the planning process according to some 
law regulations, citizens under these circumstances are constantly frustrated by a fact 
that their views are not heeded by the authorities. After all, as Arnstein (1969: 217) 
puts it, “When participation is restricted to this level, there is no follow-through, no 
‘muscle’, hence no assurance of changing the status quo”. 
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Figure 24 – Eight rungs on the ladder of citizen participation  
 
[Source: Arnstein, S. (1969)] 
 
5.2.3 A Causal Analysis of Two Contradictions in the project  
Uncovering both the power struggles among the Chinese government, experts 
(especially urban planners in this case) and citizens, I find out two contradictions, the 
government versus experts and experts versus citizens, which are deeply embedded in 
the urban ecological planning process in China. Analyzing the whys and wherefores 
behind both contradictions, I argue that China has a long way to go from its current 
situation where urban eco-planning is tentatively used as an environmental 
governance approach to being able to deal with serious environmental problems that 
are currently existing in Chinese cities.  
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Contradiction between the Government and Experts 
 
“Gui Hua, Gui Hua, Zhi Shang Hua Hua, Qiang Shang Gua Gua, Bu 
Ru Ling Dao Yi Ju Hua”  
 
(a popular saying in China’s urban planning circles alluding to the 
power of the state. The phrase may be loosely translated as describing 
the planner’s blueprints as beautiful paintings that hang on the wall 
and cannot be compared to the powerful words and directives of the 
political leaders) 
 
This common saying in China’s urban planning circles clearly represents the 
most tangible contradiction between the Chinese government and experts. There can 
be two related explanations of the causes of this contradiction: 
1) The contradiction between the government and experts (especially urban 
planners) in the urban (eco-) planning process is first ascribable to unreasonable 
values and demands of some leaders within a city government. In terms of 
‘government rationality’ (Foucault, 1991a) of modern China, the current rationality of 
a city government in China is to promote economic growth and improve the public 
image of a city. The rationality for development itself is not wrong-headed at all, but 
if some leaders of the government hasten the pace of development at the cost of 
resources, environment and public interests, rational experts (such as urban planners) 
will certainly offer resistance. In the struggles between the Nanjing Municipal 
Government and urban planners in the Nanjing eco-island project, to the proposal to 
build two bridges and three tunnels to link the isolated island with Nanjing city areas 
is the most hotly contested issue. Evidently, the government’s scheme to hastily 
construct two new bridges and three more tunnels shows the unreasonableness of the 
106 
 
external transportation plan in this ‘Nanjing eco-island’ project. Indeed, the 
face-saving culture in urban China encourages many government officials to consider 
whether the projects under construction are large enough and adequately majestic. 
Noticeably, the real rationale behind these government officials’ plan to initiate these 
projects is to create a win-win situation in which they can improve the city image 
while gaining expected political achievements at the same time. Moreover, certain 
government officials also prefer to concern themselves with short-term social benefits 
and interests for a part of the population during their terms of office. However, it is 
self-evident that the long-term social benefits and interests of the whole population 
should be placed at the top of the agenda for the government. In short, it is the 
unreasonable values and demands of some government officials trigger off the 
contestation between the government and experts in the urban (eco-) planning process 
in China.  
2) The second reason why the contradiction cannot be easily eliminated is that 
urban (eco-) planning is after all a technology of government and a policy-driven 
approach to environmental governance in China. Referring back to the reasons which 
I have stated in the Chapter 3, the Chinese state also checks on the behavior of urban 
planners within the environmental planning regimes. In fact, ever since the birth of 
modern Chinese urban planning in 1950s, urban planners have worked for state 
apparatuses and are seen as professional experts authorized by the Chinese 
government. As such, urban planners become accustomed to acting in accordance 
with the wills of some leaders in the government, which in turn bolsters up the 
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arbitrary powers of them in making unfair and unreasonable decisions. More 
fundamentally, based on Yiftachel’s (1998) contention that urban planning is an arm 
of contemporary nation-state, it is not surprising that China employs urban (eco-) 
planning as a technology of the government to control urban development with 
respect to bring about economic, social, and environmental efficiencies. At the same 
time, Chinese urban planners are not only constrained by their standing in the 
administrative structure but are also subject to state policies. According to Tang’s 
(2000: 358) translation of a standard text on urban planning (Tongji University, 1991: 
22): 
 
“…especially in the formulation of master plans, the resolution of 
some important issues must be based on the relevant guidelines and 
policies of the state. Thus urban planners should enhance state policies 
by learning diligently all sorts of guidelines and policies and carrying 
them out conscientiously in practice.” 
 
Given that the strategic orientation of these guidelines or policies is often a clear 
manifestation of the overarching aim of the Chinese government, urban planners, 
being expected to bear these guidelines and policies in mind, usually dare not run the 
risk of making a plan against the government’s intentions. This echoes Healey’s (1997: 
82) argument that “planning will be defined as an approach to governance which 
embodies a policy-driven approach … and which inter-relates economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of issues”. In a nutshell, of the use of urban (eco-) planning 
as a technology of government and a policy-driven approach is the root cause of the 




Contradiction between Experts and Citizens 
Apart from some reasons I elaborated in Chapter 4 behind the low level of 
citizen participation in environmental governance in Nanjing, two other important 
reasons can be attributed to this contradiction between experts (especially urban 
planners) and citizens in the urban (eco-) planning process in China:  
1) Based on the knowledge of urban planning being a technology of 
government, some urban planners become ‘government spokesmen’ in backing up the 
government’s views and not believing in citizen participation. Given the control of the 
government, an increasing number of urban planners have no choice but to become 
spokesmen for the government supporting government’s intentions and translating 
these intentions into planning drawings. Some urban planners have even turned into 
‘technical bureaucrats’ (Ji Shu Guan Liao, as we say in Chinese) who become tools of 
the government. These ‘technical bureaucrats’ follow every detailed instruction from 
their superiors – the government – and deliberately overlook equal benefits among 
different subjects in the urban ecological planning process. Because these urban 
planners, whether wittingly or unwittingly, are forced into thinking about the 
government’s planning intentions, some of them firmly believe citizen participation 
will not only decrease their work efficiency but also increase administrative costs, 
while some others even seeing citizen participation as a kind of meaningless dispute. 
As a result, these urban planners, coloured by government’s positions, are always 
skeptical about the usefulness of the citizen participation. Very often, they tend to use 
different sorts of excuses to delay the progress of citizen participation before the 
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planning is finalized. Only until all the technical issues are resolved will they ask for 
advice from ordinary citizens thereafter.  
2) In addition, the contradiction between urban planners and citizens is 
intensified because urban planners with a lot of technical skills and professional 
knowledge consider their knowledge, perception and judgment about a planning 
project as being at a higher level than ordinary citizens, and are thus reluctant to bend 
their mind to consider citizens’ ideas about the planning project. As illustrated above, 
urban planners are a group of persons who have considerable expertise in dealing with 
urban development issues. This professional expertise can only be acquired by a small 
number of people through higher university/college education. In the ordinary course 
of events, lay individuals are unlikely to truly understand the technical expertise and 
the profound planning ideology of a project. Instead, on account of their own lived 
experiences, ordinary citizens are inclined to depend on their perceptual knowledge 
rather than rational knowledge to express their concerns about a planning project. 
More interestingly, during the process of citizen participation, the issues citizens show 
solicitude for mostly are related with their own personal interests, having no 
correlative relationship with safeguarding the overall benefit of the whole society. 
Consider, for example, that most participative contents citizens are interested in 
include issues of sight line, sunlight’s coverage, noises and green space, among others. 
In a word, given that matters of concern vary a lot between urban planners and 
ordinary citizens, I argue that understandings and ideas about the citizen participation 
in a specific planning project are unlikely to be identical and even incompatible, thus 
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leading to conflict between experts and ordinary citizens.   
5.3 Migration of Nanjing’s Iconic Phoenix Trees for Subway Expansion Plan 
As I have demonstrated above, the ‘Nanjing eco-island’ project demonstrates 
that two problems – the government’s intentions being incorporated in experts’ 
planning ideology and public opinion being not respected and accepted – lie beneath 
much of the urban ecological planning process in Nanjing and more broadly in urban 
China. However, both problems may not occur in every urban eco-planning project in 
the Chinese context. For example, the following case of ‘Migration of Nanjing Iconic 
Phoenix Trees’ reveals a crucial mediating role of experts and the importance of 
effective citizenry resistance with the assistance of experts in urban China’s 
eco-planning processes. 
5.3.1 Project Introduction and Key Issues of This Project 
In early 2011, Nanjing Municipal Government decided to transplant and 
relocate more than two hundred Nanjing’s Phoenix trees (aka. Wutong Trees) aged 70 
to 80 years for a subway expansion plan. On 9 March 2011, Nanjing citizens suddenly 
found 40 Phoenix trees along the downtown street being chopped down with hundreds 
more marked for removal to clear the way for new subway lines (Figures 25 & 26). 
Because these trees are historical icons in Nanjing with many being planted when the 
city was a capital of the Republic of China before a civil war broke up in 1949, many 
famous environmental experts and environmentalists (like J.H. Cai & N.N. Li) called 
upon Chinese citizens to save these trees through televised interviews and 
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micro-blogs such as Weibo – the Chinese version of Twitter (here this kind of new 
media plays a role as facilitator to shape and influence the manner and means of 
citizen participation in Nanjing and broadly in urban China). 
 
“I think it’s not a wise decision to move so many phoenix trees right 
now because a special growth characteristic of this tree determines that 
its transplanted tree survival rate is quite low. Back to 2006, only 12 
out of 89 moved phoenix trees are still alive during the construction of 
subway line 2 in Nanjing” (Cai, famous botanist in Chinese Academy 
of Sciences) 
 
“When urban planners are conducting a plan, they should take full 
account of issues of the environmental impact of a construction project 
in case of over-development of this project. However, the EIA process 
in many Chinese urban development projects is just like a formality … 
According to my knowledge, this ‘Transplantation of Nanjing Phoenix 
Trees’ project doesn’t go through a strict EIA test as well” (Li, senior 
urban planners in Jiangsu Institute of Urban Planning and Design) 
 
After realizing this information via micro-blogging sites, some netizens 
appealed for a sit-in activity on the square in front of the city library of Nanjing on 
March 19 2011 for a peaceful protest. As of March 14 2011 more than 11,000 people 
signed for this activity. After the sit-in protest (Figure 27), Nanjing authority 
temporarily suspended the tree-felling plan and promised citizens that they will 
amend the subway expansion plan so as to minimize the number of Phoenix trees 
transplanted. 
This case allows us sense how strong the willingness of Nanjing citizens is to 
protect environment in their own hometown. In this case, Nanjing citizens actively 
involved themselves in the “Saving the Nanjing Phoenix Trees” activity through some 
effective participative means, ultimately successfully expressing their opinion and 
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exerting great influence on the decision-making process in Nanjing authority. In terms 
of an earlier discussion about bottom-up environmental governance in Chapter 2, this 
case can be termed as an example of active citizen participation in the urban China’s 
context and clearly demonstrates how Nanjing citizens successfully resisted the state 
with their counter tactics and conducts (Foucault, 2007). Even more remarkable, the 
success of having Nanjing authority listen to the voices from the grassroots is in large 
part due to a fact that the experts were able to inform and mobilize ordinary citizens 
about the project via certain channels. Indeed, it is because of the good interactive 
communication between experts and citizens in this project that some satisfactory 
deliberative outcomes “come more from the margins than from the established center 
of the spectrum of opinions” (Habermas, 1996: 275).  
 
Figure 25 – Around 40 phoenix trees being chopped down along the downtown 







Figure 26 – Hundreds more trees are marked for transplantation and these green 

















Figure 27 – A sit-in activity on the square in front of the city library on March 19, 




5.3.2 The Mediating Role of Experts in Urban Ecological Planning  
To go back to the preceding discussion in Chapter 2 on China’s social 
environmentalism and environmental planning as a form of governance, the thesis has 
underlined the significance of experts’ role as capable and uncorrupted elites who can 
contribute their skills and insights to the environmental governance process for 
improved environmental outcomes. Moreover, from the second case of the Nanjing 
Phoenix trees, I further argue that the changing role of experts from past technical 
professionals working for the government to skilled communicators between 
authorities and citizens is a good sign for urban ecological planning as a promising 
environmental governance approach in the Chinese context. Throughout Chinese 
history, experts (especially urban planners) with knowledge of instrumental nature 
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have been regarded as merely technocrats or a necessary government tool in the urban 
planning process simplified as a technical process. Yet, in light of “standards of 
procedural equity, participation, non-deception and non-manipulation” (White, 1988: 
76-77), an appropriate role of experts should be that of unbiased and critical 
communicators enabling a dialogue on an equal footing between the authority and the 
grassroots. Moreover, in terms of Davidoff (1996: 307), planners (and more broadly, 
experts) “should be able to engage in the political process as advocates of the interests 
both of government and of such other groups, organizations or individuals”. When 
confronting a wide divergence between the opinions and values of authorities and the 
grass roots, urban planners (broadly experts) should be more responsible to their 
clients – in this case, their fellow citizens - and seek to express their views. In this 
sense, experts should transcend the barriers between themselves and non-specialists 
and be in concert with these grassroots citizens who are otherwise constrained by their 
little political clout in the decision-making process in urban China.  
How then can experts establish a partnership with ordinary citizens, in which 
experts and citizens communicate with each other and with the government officials 
who need to ultimately to carry out the discursively expressed public will? First, it is 
interesting to observe from the case of ‘Migration of Nanjing’s Iconic Phoenix Trees’ 
that arguments the experts provide for ordinary citizens to aid these citizens in 
achieving their interests are crucial. Indeed, the insights experts lend to lay individuals 
can be used as ‘a bargaining chip’ for future negotiations and consensus building 
practices with the government. Therefore, these experts’ insights must be unbiased in 
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arguments and critical in stance to adequately reflect the truth of matters in a society. 
Secondly, if experts would like to bring about collective will formation, they will 
have to take on the lay perspective by communicating in the ordinary language of 
citizens, no matter how specialized the knowledge they wish to deploy. Last but not 
least, this case also enables us to understand that the very effective interaction 
between experts and ordinary citizens is a result of experts utilizing certain forms of 
cutting-edge media (i.e. micro-blogging) to disseminate their opinions and arguments 
to the public. Through micro-blogging, not only can citizens obtain experts’ 
viewpoints in a timely manner, but citizens are able to react immediately to their 
arguments and air their own opinions simultaneously. Indeed, when the trend of 
establishing partnership between experts and citizens is combined with deployment of 
cutting-edge media, the very boundaries of expertise are increasingly blurred and the 
communicative power Healey (1997) advocates is greatly strengthened.  
5.4 Urban (Eco-) Planning as a Promising Form of Environmental Governance 
in Nanjing and Broadly in Urban China  
While the above example may be an exceptional case, it nevertheless does 
contribute to the existing literature which tends to downplay the role of ‘experts’ and 
supports strong citizen participation in the environmental governance process. 
However, under present national conditions of China, I believe the emerging and 
changing role of experts is a good sign in the urban (eco-) planning process as a 
promising environmental governance approach to resolve present-day China’s 
environmental crises. At the same time, Chinese government should also be more 
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open to alternative viewpoints and take heed of citizenry resistance to its plans as 
aided by the guidance and know-how of experts. Nonetheless, I am also keenly aware 
of that if China wishes to truly realize good environmental governance and goals in 
the ecological modernization process in the near future, a common platform on which 
all shareholders can interact with each other on an equal footing with few conflicts 
must be established. This interactive platform can take shape provided that the 
Chinese governments improves the institutional environment by listening to public 
opinion before starting a project, the citizens enhance their personal knowledge and 
capacities for effective citizen participation, and experts continue to play an important 
role as critical and unbiased communicators bridging the gap between the government 
and citizens. Thus, there is an urgent need to go beyond the existing understanding of 
core issues in present urban (eco-) planning process and further explore how 
collaborative planning (Healey, 1997; 1998), as a third environmental governance 
approach can become an integral part of environmental governance that China will 
endeavor to achieve on its path to future sustainable development.  
The ways of thinking in the urban collaborative planning processes and urban 
governance processes are similar, holding out the same hope for the emergence of a 
‘shared-power world’ (Bryson and Grosby, 1992) in which needs for economic 
development, social harmony and environmental protection are reconciled. Both 
processes are also generally social processes in which social meanings and social 
practices are constructed through discourse (a framework of knowledge formation and 
distribution within which participants make sense of their lives). According to Healey 
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(1998: 1531), a collaborative planning approach to a field of governance involves 
“building new policy discourses about the qualities of places, developing 
collaboration among stakeholders in policy development as well as delivery, widening 
stakeholder involvement beyond traditional power elites, recognizing different forms 
of local knowledge, and building rich social networks as a resource of institutional 
capital through which new initiatives can be taken rapidly and legitimately”.  
Reflecting on Healey’s (1998) understandings about collaborative planning, I 
find there are at least two viewpoints China should learn and put into practice to 
enable present urban (eco-) planning process to become a promising form of 
environmental governance that can resolve serious environmental problems. Firstly, 
every stakeholder in a society should find his or her ‘voice’ as one adding value to 
ongoing urban planning. It is true that more citizens, companies, pressure groups and 
agencies want to assert their stake in planning projects, although their perceptions, 
interests, and expectations may be quite different. Hence, both expert and non-expert 
forms of rhetoric should be carefully accommodated in the collaborative planning 
Healey advocates. In this sense, the expression of “some needs, interests, and 
suffering of injustice” (Young, 2000: 37) is largely irrelevant in the process of 
collaborative planning. Instead, in order to improve material quality of life, a sense of 
identity and the well being of the entire population in a city, ‘deliberative inclusion’ 
(Habermas, 1996) and equality of access and influence among participants in 
deliberation are of paramount importance in the collaborative planning process. 
Secondly, collaborative planning as an approach to environmental governance 
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also seeks more efficient ways of conflict management. When power is diffused, 
diverse conflicts are bound to emerge in different political arenas of a city. 
Collaborative planning approach, on the contrary, helps to create communicative and 
mediatory environments through which stakeholders can mutually learn each others’ 
claims about a plan, negotiate with each other based on ‘the unforced force of the 
better argument’ (Habermas, 1996: 541) and even build up consensus on strategic 
issues. Only when political conflicts are mediated at the start of urban planning 
processes will there are shared premises and trust among all the participants to 
respond flexibly to future new situations. All in all, “through building shared 
knowledge and understanding, generating opportunities for creative synergy, and 
developing the capacity among stakeholders to work together locally to solve 
common problems” (Healey, 1998: 18), collaborative planning is the path China has 
to walk on towards the realization of good environmental governance and goals in the 




Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
The central focus of this thesis has been to critically problematize the notion of 
environmental governance from three dimensions for realization of good 
environmental governance and goals in the process of ecological modernization in 
urban China. The first dimension is from a top-down environmental governance 
approach by the state, the second perspective is from bottom-up approach to 
environmental governance by the civil society, and finally the third looks at urban 
ecological planning as a form of environmental governance. Through my empirical 
analysis of a specific city, Nanjing, I have highlighted the contested environmental 
governance and limited citizen participation in urban China. In addition, I have also 
examined two contradictions and how both contradictions can potentially be mediated 
in the urban ecological planning processes in Nanjing and more broadly in urban 
China as well. 
This final chapter summarizes the empirical findings and key arguments of the 
thesis and is divided into three sections. First, I review how each chapter addresses the 
research questions. Second, I summarize key arguments that plug a gap in the existing 
literature in this thesis. Finally, I make some helpful final comments by way of 
closure. 
6.1 Chapter Summaries 
In Chapter One, I broadly outlined the research problems I set out to examine: 
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first, to understand how the state/government plays a leading role in establishing and 
implementing regimes to resolve environmental issues in urban China and to analyze 
why effective environmental governance regimes are hard to forge in Nanjing and 
broadly in urban China; second, to gain an understanding of reasons behind and 
measures taken towards low citizen participation rates in Nanjing and broadly in 
urban China; third, to examine how an urban ecological planning process is a 
promising form of environmental governance for Nanjing and more broadly urban 
China. Besides outlining my research questions, Chapter One also provided a 
discussion of the two methods - interviews and surveys - that I employed in my 
fieldwork.  
Chapter Two reviewed two bodies of literature relating to my thesis topic 
‘urban environmental governance’, including Ecological Modernization (EM) theory 
and Governance theory. Under the discussion about Ecological Modernization theory, 
I not only clearly defined the conception of ecological modernization but also 
concentrated on a crucial part of this theory – social environmentalism especially in 
the context of urban China. Subsequently, I used a Governance Theory including 
Foucault’s (1991a) Governmentality theory and Healey’s (1997) Collaborative 
Planning theory to elaborate the three dimensions of environmental governance in this 
thesis. In this chapter, several key strands emerged from the literature that justified 
and guided my study. To be specific, some arguments supported my understandings of 
the contributing factors to key issues in the three subthemes of the thesis, even as 
others entailed in discussions around further improvement in environmental 
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governance regimes, perfection of citizen participation mechanism, and the 
optimization of the urban ecological planning process in environmental governance 
processes in urban China.  
Chapter Three to Chapter Five are the empirical chapters in the thesis. These 
three chapters attempt to find the most feasible and effective ways for China to realize 
good environmental governance and accelerate the progress of ecological 
modernization. Drawing on interviews and surveys with some government officials, 
citizens and experts (including urban planners, ecologists, botanists) in Nanjing, each 
chapter explored core issues, analyzed contributing reasons and proposed 
corresponding measures under the three sub-themes of this thesis respectively.  
Chapter Three examined why the very effective environmental governance 
regimes, namely horizontal cooperation regime and vertical accountability regime, are 
hard to forge in urban China’s context. Through an empirical analysis of the contested 
horizontal cooperation regime in Nanjing, the chapter demonstrated that due to 1) the 
subordinate positionality of local Environmental Protection Bureau, 2) selfish 
departmentalism, and 3) internal functional conflicts within all relevant government 
agencies in environmental governance in Nanjing, there has been a lot of stress and 
strains on the formation of horizontal cooperation regime in this city. In the case of 
the contested vertical accountability regime in Nanjing, the structural problem in this 
regime manifests itself from two aspects. On the one hand, professional 
environmental protection resources are over-centralized in the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection of PRC; while on the other hand, the political space 
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provided for local Environmental Protection Bureaus is confined. Finally, this 
empirical chapter put forth some ideas for further improvement and innovation within 
contested horizontal and vertical environmental governance regimes in the context of 
urban China.  
Chapter four considered how citizen participation in environmental governance 
in Nanjing and more broadly in urban China still stays at levels of ‘Non-participation’ 
and ‘Tokenism’ in ‘a ladder of citizen participation’ (Arnstein, 1969). In this chapter, I 
have investigated some limitations of citizen participation that are common both in 
Nanjing and in the rest of urban China. These limitations are: 1) citizen participation 
being led mainly by the government in the urban environmental governance process, 
2) the limited scope and depth of citizen participation in urban environmental 
governance, 3) restrictions on the ways in which citizen can participate in urban 
environmental governance, as well as 4) the total effect of citizen participation in 
urban environmental governance being far from satisfactory. Subsequently, this 
chapter focused on teasing out subjective and objective factors that account for these 
limitations. Subjectively, citizens rely too much on the government and are devoid of 
an inherent driving force in the citizen participation process. In addition, these 
limitations can also be ascribed to other three objective reasons: 1) the legal 
framework for citizens to participate being immature, 2) the cost of collecting useful 
inputs by citizens being very high and 3) approaches to citizen participation being 
insufficient. Ultimately, this empirical analysis of limited citizen participation in 
Nanjing revealed some feasible and effective measures to improve the mechanism for 
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citizen participation in environmental governance in urban China.  
Based on two ecological planning cases in Nanjing (including projects of 
constructing Nanjing eco-island and transplanting Nanjing’s iconic phoenix trees), 
Chapter Five investigated urban ecological planning as a third environmental 
governance approach to resolve urban environmental issues. The first case explored 
how and why two clashes – the government versus experts (urban planners in this 
case) and experts versus citizens – crop up and are intensified in the planning process, 
arguing that the root cause is that urban (eco-) planning is a technology of government 
and a policy-driven approach to environmental governance in China. My second 
empirical example revealed that the changing role of experts (including urban 
planners, ecologists, botanists) from technical professionals working for the 
government to skilled communicators between authorities and citizens is a feasible 
and effective way to mediate the abovementioned two contradictions in the urban 
(eco-) planning process in China. Moreover, the Chinese government should not only 
be more open to alternative viewpoints and take note of citizenry resistance to its 
plans as aided by the guidance and know-how of experts, but also find more effective 
ways to widen stakeholder involvement and strengthen conflict management 
capabilities (see Healey’s (1997; 1998) notion of ‘collaborative planning’) in the near 
future.  
6.2 Contributions and Findings  
Many standpoints examined in the conceptual framework of this thesis 
emphasized the significance of decentralizing the participation of the state to the civil 
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society in the environmental governance process (cf. Jessop, 1997a; Buttel, 2000; Mol, 
2000; van Kersbergen & van Waarden, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2005; Gouldson et al, 
2007; May, 2008 and van Vilet 2008). This is supported by much of the literature that 
argues that achieving good environmental governance calls for gradual relaxation of 
state/governmental control, if not hollowing out the state, since a strong 
state/government is not associated with the economic and political ideals of 
democracy. Additionally, environmental governance process has also been seen as a 
social process in which civil society participation is fully taken into account, with 
many articles suggesting that citizens are capable of exercising their own rights to 
participate and influence decisions in the environmental governance process. 
In contrast with the main arguments in the existing literature, the context of 
urban China suggests that this may not always be so. Therefore, this thesis has sought 
to provide an understanding of how the Chinese state/government will remain as the 
most crucial force in the environmental governance process for a long time to come. 
Hence, the Chinese state/government should seek more feasible and effective 
approaches to existing environmental governance issues and follow its own trajectory 
towards realization of good environmental governance and goals in ecological 
modernization in the future. Across the three empirical chapters, a number of 
corresponding main arguments have emerged. 
My research demonstrated that the position of state/government in establishing 
and implementing environmental governance regimes is still foremost in present-day 
modern China. Moreover, due to inevitable contested environmental governance 
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regimes in China nowadays, the most viable solution to problems in environmental 
governance regimes should be reflexive institutional learning through which 
states/governments can make changes to their problematic management regimes 
internally. As my thesis has put forth, the setting up of an Environment and Resource 
Coordination Committee and the delegation of administrative power to provincial 
governments can be two appropriate strategies that the state can adopt for the 
greening of environmental governance regimes in urban China. Nevertheless, I do not 
wish to overstate the role of state/government in the environmental governance 
process in urban China as whether the effectiveness of environmental governance also 
depends on the formation of a mature civil society beyond direct state and economic 
control in which individuals and social groups are able to find their own voice with 
equal opportunities to influence deliberative outcomes. However, provided that the 
forging of a civil society in urban China will be a great challenge for a long time to 
come, it is more profitable to deliberate on how the state/government can rationalize 
its intervention in the light of limited citizen participation in modern Chinese cities. 
As such, I propose that Chinese governments should 1) revamp existing legal system 
about citizen participation in environmental protection, 2) establish and further 
improve on an Environmental Information Disclosure System, 3) remain committed 
to work of publicity and education on environmental protection issues and finally 4) 
optimize citizens’ participative approaches. 
In addressing the role of experts in environmental management processes, many 
scholars (Johnson, 1993; Hajer, 1995; Reed, 1996; Foucault, 1997; Raco & Imrie, 
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2000) have first criticized the potential pitfalls of relying too much on ‘technical 
choices’ and ‘technocratic knowledge’, before moving on to argue in favor of the 
empowerment of citizens’ rights to critique and resist defects of governmental 
regimes in the process of environmental governance. However, my research 
illustrated circumstances in China’s environmental governance process whereby 
experts’ opinions are overridden by governmental intentions. In such situations, it is 
also unrealistic for Chinese governments to endow every citizen with power sufficient 
to resist their own schemes. Thus, I have argued it makes more practical sense for 
governments to adapt to the role transformation of experts into unbiased and critical 
communicators who are not only able to mediate contestations among stakeholders 
but can also lend their insights to ordinary citizens for the latter to participate 
reasonably and intelligently in the China’s environmental governance process. As 
such, I have further argued that Chinese governments should be more open to 
alternative viewpoints from both experts and non-experts and be in the midst of close 
self-examination over citizenry resistance to its plans as aided by the experts. Finally, 
I have suggested that there is a promising prospect that Chinese governments, with 
continual institutional experimentation and reform, will be able to change the present 
environmental governance process into a participatory, interactive and social process 
in the not so distant future.  
6.3 Final Comments 
Insofar as all environmental-ecological arguments are arguments about 
economy and politics (Harvey, 1996: 372), there is ground for optimism that through 
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many far-reaching reforms, the environmental governance process will eventually 
become more democratic in urban China’s context, albeit at a gradual rate. It is 
precisely because China has followed Deng Xiaoping’s gradualist approach that its 
economic reform and development has been so eminently successful. Such is the 
Chinese nature of reform and development. China’s reform in the environmental 
governance process is also one kind of political reform or democratization that is now 
being carried out gradually and experimentally. Hence, on the path towards the 
realization of good environmental governance and goals in the ecological 
modernization process, I firmly believe that political democracy will eventually take 
root in the environmental governance process. The democratization process may be 
long drawn out, but step-by-step, it will one day reach a successful level of 















Adkin, L 1992b, ‘Counter-hegemony and environmental politics in Canada’ in 
Organizing dissent: contemporary social movements in theory and practice, eds W 
Carroll, Garamond Press, Toronto.  
 
Adkin, L 1994, ‘Environmental politics, political economy, and social democracy in 
Canada’, Studies in Political Economy, vol. 45, pp. 130-169.  
 
Alter, C & Hage, J 1993, Organizations working together, Sage Publications, 
Newbury Park, Calif.  
 
Appadurai, A 2001, ‘Deep democracy: urban governmentality and the horizon of 
politics’, Environment and Urbanization, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 23-43. 
 
Arnstein, SR 1969, ‘A ladder of citizen participation’, JAIP, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 
216-224.  
 
Baber, WF & Bartlett, RV 2005, Deliberative environmental politics: democracy and 
ecological rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge.  
 
Baden, J & Stroup, R 1990, ‘Natural resource scarcity, entrepreneurship, and the 
political economy of hope’ in Economics and the environment: a reconciliation, eds 
W Block, Fraser Institute, Vancouver, pp. 117-136.  
 
Beeson, M 2010a, ‘The coming of environmental authoritarianism’, Environmental 
Politics, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 276-294. 
 
Briassoulis, H 1989, ‘Theoretical orientations in environmental planning: an inquiry 
into alternative approaches’, Environmental Management, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 381-392.  
 
Bryson, J & Crosby, B 1992, Leadership in the common good, Jossey Bass, San 
Francisco.  
 
Buttel, FH 2000, ‘Ecological modernization as social theory’, Geoforum, vol. 31, pp. 
57-65.  
 
Carter, NT & Mol, APJ (eds) 2007, Environmental governance in China, Routledge, 
London & New York.  
 
Chen, WG 2009, Research of public participation in environmental governance. 




Christoff, P 1996, ‘Ecological Modernization, Ecological Modernities’, 
Environmental Politics, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 476-500. 
 
Dahl, R 2006, On political equality, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
 
Dollar, D 2008, Lessons from China for Africa, Available from: 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan044840.pdf
>. [5 July 2011]. 
 
Davidoff, P 1996, ‘Advocacy and pluralism in planning’ in Readings in planning 
theory, eds S Campbell & S Fainstein, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 305-322.  
 
Economy, EC 2004, The river runs black: the environmental challenge to China’s 
future, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London.  
 
Environment and Development Research Center of Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences 2004, China environment and development review (vol. 2), Social Sciences 
Academic Press, Beijing [in Chinese]. 
 
Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1989. Available 
from: <http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=6229>. [5 July 2011].  
 
Faludi, A 1973, A reader in planning theory, Pergamon Press, New York & Oxford. 
 
Faludi, A 1973, Planning theory, Pergamon Press, New York & Oxford. 
 
Fan, JY 2010, The eco-environment governance research in the visual threshold of 
political science – a case study of Kunshan. Ph.D thesis, Soochow University. 
 
Foucault, M 1986, ‘Of other spaces’, Diacritics, vol. 6, pp. 22-27. 
 
Foucault, M 1991a, ‘Governmentality’ in The Foucault effect, eds G Burchell, C 
Gordon & P Miller, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 87-104. 
 
Foucault, M 1997, The politics of truth, MIT Press, Cambridge.  
 
Foucault, M 2003, ‘17 March 1976’ in Society must be defended: lectures at the 
Collège de France 1975–1976, eds M Bertani & A Fontana, Picador, New York, pp. 
239–264. 
 
Foucault, M 2007, ‘15 February 1978’ in Security, territory, population: lectures at 





Fudge, C & Rowe, J 2001, ‘Ecological modernisation as a framework for sustainable 
development: a case study in Sweden’, Environment and Planning A, vol. 33, pp. 
1527-1546.  
 
Giddens, A 1994, Beyond left and right: the future of radical politics, Polity Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Gouldson, A, Hills, P & Welford, R 2008, ‘Ecological modernisation and policy 
learning in Hong Kong’, Geoforum, vol. 39, pp. 319-330.  
 
Guo, YH 2004, Towards green civilization, China Social Sciences Press, Beijing [in 
Chinese].  
 
Hajer, M 1995, The politics of environmental discourse: ecological modernisation 
and the policy process, Oxford University Press, New York and London. 
 
Harvey, D 1993, ‘The nature of the environment: the dialectics of social and 
environmental change’ in Real problems, false solutions: socialist register, eds 
Miliband & Panitch, Merlin Press, London, pp. 1-51.  
 
Harvey, D 1996, Justice, nature and the geography of difference, Blackwell 
Publishers, Cambridge.  
 
Habermas, J 1970, Toward a rational society, Beacon Press, Boston.  
 
Habermas, J 1974, ‘The public sphere’, New German Critique, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 
49-55.  
 
Habermas, J 1996, Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of 
law and democracy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.  
 
He, SJ & Wu, FL 2009, ‘China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism: perspective from 
urban redevelopment’, Antipode, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 282-304. 
 
Healey, P 1997, Collaborative planning: shaping places in fragmented societies, 
Macmillan Press LTD, London. 
 
Healey, P 1998, ‘Building institutional capacity through collaborative approaches to 
urban planning’, Environment and Planning A, vol. 30, pp. 1531-1546.  
 
Healey, P 1998, ‘Collaborative planning in a stakeholder society’, Town Planning 
Review, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 1-21.  
 
Held, D 1995, ‘Democracy and the new international order’ in Cosmopolitan 
132 
 
democracy: an agenda for a new world order, eds D Archibugi & D Held, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, pp. 96-120. 
 
Hollis, M & Nell, EJ 1975, Rational economic man: a philosophical critique of 
neo-classical economics, Cambridge University Press, London & New York. 
 
Howell, J 2004b, ‘Getting to the roots: governance pathologies and future prospects’ 
in Governance in China, eds J Howell, Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc., Oxford, 
pp. 226-240. 
 
Huber, J 1982, Die verlorene Unschuld der ökologie: Neue Technologien und 
superindustrielle Entwicklung, Fisher Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. 
 
Huber, J 1991, Unternehmen Umwelt: Weichenstellungen für eine ökologische 
Marktwirtschaft, Fisher Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. 
 
Huxley, M 2008, ‘Space and government: governmentality and geography’, 
Geography Compass, vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 1635-1658.  
 
Jänicke, M 1993, ‘Über ökologische und politieke Modernisierungen’, Zeitschrift für 
Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht, vol. 2, pp. 159-175. 
 
Jeans, DN 1974, ‘Changing formulation of the man-environment relationship in 
Anglo-American Geography’, Journal of Geography, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 36-40.  
 
Jessop, B 1997a, ‘Capitalism and its future: remarks on regulation, government and 
governance’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 561-581. 
 
Johnson, T 1993, ‘Expertise and the state’ in Foucault’s new domains, eds M Gane & 
T Johnson, Routledge, London, pp. 139-152.  
 
Keil, R 1994, ‘Green work alliances: the political economy of social ecology’, Studies 
in Political Economy, vol. 44, pp. 7-38.  
 
Keil, R & Desfor, G 2003, ‘Ecological modernisation in Los Angeles and Toronto’, 
Local Environment, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 27-44.  
 
Kim, PS, Halligan, J, Cho, N, Oh, CH & Eikenberry, AM 2005, ‘Toward participatory 
and transparent governance: report on the sixth global forum on reinventing 
government’, Public Administration Review, vol. 65, no. 6, pp. 646-654. 
 
Klingemann, H 1999, ‘Mapping political support in the 1990s: a global analysis’ in 
Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance, eds P Norris, Oxford 
University Press, New York, pp. 31-56. 
133 
 
Koger, SM & Winter, DDN 2010, The psychology of environmental problems, 
Psychology Press, New York. 
 
Langhelle, O 2000, ‘Why ecological modernization and sustainable development 
should not be conflated’, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, vol. 2, pp. 
303-322.  
 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Urban and Rural Planning, 2007. Available 
from: <http://njlszx.com/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=373>. [5 July 
2011].  
 
Lawinfo China, 2011, Laws and regulations about environmental protection in China. 
Available from: Lawinfo China. [5 July 2011]. 
 
Lazzarato, M 2002, ‘From biopower to biopolitics’, The Warwick Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 13, pp. 1-6.  
Lee, YS 2009, ‘Eco-island to built in Nanjing’, The Straits Times, 26 May. Available 
from <http://160.96.186.100/lib/pdf/2009/May/ST2606.pdf>. [6 July 2011].  
 
Li, RC 2008, ‘Li Shun Wo Guo Huan Jing Zhi Li Wang Luo De Fu Ji Guan Xi’, 
Journal of Guangdong Institute of Public Administration, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 28-32 [in 
Chinese].  
 
Liu, H 2004, ‘A study of urbanization and urban ecological problems in China’, 
Journal of Wuyi University (Natural Science Edition), vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 68-78 [in 
Chinese].  
 
Liu, SD 2008, ‘First environmental index of resident livelihood: 70% people are in 
favor of green GDP’, China Economic Times, 8 January [in Chinese].  
 
Lofland, LH 1998, The public realm: exploring the city’s quintessential social 
territory, Transaction Publishers, New York. 
 
Liu, XB (ed.) 2010, Environmental impact assessment, China Environmental Science 
Press, Beijing [in Chinese].  
 
Ma, Q 2009, ‘Eco-city and eco-planning in China: taking an example for Caofeidian 
eco-city’, The 4th international conference of the international forum on urbanism, pp. 
511-520. Available from: <http://newurbanquestion.ifou.org/proceedings/>. [5 July 
2011].  
 
Massey, D 2005, For space, Sage, London. 
 
May, S 2008, ‘Ecological citizenship and a plan for sustainable development’, City, 
134 
 
vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 237-244.  
 
Michaud, K, Carlisle, J & Smith, E 2008, ‘Nimbyism vs. environmentalism in 
attitudes toward energy development’, Environmental Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 
20-39.  
 
Mol, APJ 2000, ‘The environmental movement in an era of ecological modernisation’, 
Geoforum, vol. 31, pp. 45-56. 
 
Muller, J 1992, ‘From survey to strategy: twentieth century developments in western 
planning method’, Planning Perspectives, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 125-155. 
 
Nanjing Urban Planning Bureau 2010, Conceptual master plan of Singapore · Nanjing 
Eco High-tech Island, Nanjing [in Chinese]. 
 
National Bureau of Statistics of China 2001-2009, China statistical yearbook on 
environment, China Statistical Publishing House, Beijing [in Chinese]. 
 
O’Neill, M 1996, Environmental action begins with environmental literacy. Available 
from: <http://www.sdearthtimes.com/et0596/et0596s4.html>. [5 July 2011].  
 
Paehlke, RC 1989, Environmentalism and the future of progressive Politics, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT & London. 
 
Painter, J 1999, ‘Local government and governance’ in The changing geography of 
the UK, eds V Gardiner & H Matthews, Routledge, New York, pp. 296-314.  
 
Painter, J 2000, ‘State and governance’ in A companion to economic geography, eds E 
Sheppard & TJ Barnes, Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA, pp. 359-376.  
 
Pal, LA 1990, ‘Knowledge, power, and policy: reflections on Foucault’ in Social 
scientists, policy, and the state, eds S Brooks & AG Gagnon, Praeger, New York, pp. 
139-158.  
 
Parson, E 2000, ‘Environmental trends and environmental governance in Canada’, 
Canadian Public Policy, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. S123-S143. 
 
Pepper, D 1996, Modern environmentalism: an introduction, Routledge, New York.  
 
Pereira, AA 2003, State collaboration and development strategies in China: the case 
of the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (1992-2002), Routledge, New York.  
 
Pow, CP & Neo, H 2010, ‘Building ecotopia: critical reflections on eco-city 
development in China’ in Toward a livable and sustainable urban environment, eds 
135 
 
LF Lye & G Chen, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, pp. 91-105.  
 
Raco, M & Imrie, R 2000, ‘Governmentality and rights and responsibilities in urban 
policy’, Environment and Planning A, vol. 32, no. 12, pp. 2187-2204. 
 
Reed, MI 1996, ‘Expert power and control in late modernity: an empirical review and 
theoretical synthesis’, Organization Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 573-597. 
 
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government 




Sarkar, S 1999, Eco-socialism or eco-capitalism?: a critical analysis of humanity’s 
fundamental choices, Zed Books, London.  
 
Seippel, Ø 2000, ‘Ecological modernization as a theoretical device: strengths and 
weaknesses’, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, vol. 2, pp. 287-302.  
 
Shearman, DJC & Smith, JW 2007, The climate change challenge and the failure of 
democracy, Praeger Publishers, Westport. 
 
Sheng, DL 2009, China's sham information disclosure law. Available from: 
<http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2009/04/30/chinas_sham_information_disclosure_l
aw/7220/>. [5 July 2011].  
 
Smith, N 2006, ‘Foreword’ in In the nature of cities: urban political ecology and the 
politics of urban metabolism, eds NC Heynen, M Kaika & E Swyngedouw, Routledge, 
New York, pp. xi-xv.  
 
Song, HS 2004, Research on public participation strategy of environmental 
administration. Master thesis, Tsinghua University [in Chinese]. 
 
Spaargaren, G & van Vliet, B 2000, ‘Lifestyles, consumption and the environment: 
the ecological modernisation of domestic consumption’, Environmental Politics, vol. 
9, no. 1, pp. 50–76. 
 
Swyngedouw, E 2005, ‘Governance innovation and the citizen: the Janus face of 
governance-beyond-the-state’, Urban Studies, vol. 42, no. 11, pp. 1991-2006.  
 
Tang, WS 2000, ‘Chinese urban planning at fifty: an assessment of the planning 
theory literature’, Journal of Planning Literature, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 347-366.  
 
Tetsuhiko, S 1999, Nature, environment, and human being: Hans Jonas on the 
136 
 
principle of responsibility. Available from: <www2.ipcku.kansai-u.ac.jp>. [29 
November 2011]. 
 
Tian, L 2005, ‘On the subject, content and method of public participation in 
environmental assessment’, Journal of Lanzhou University (Social Sciences), vol. 33, 
no.5, pp. 131-135 [in Chinese]. 
 
Tongji University 1991, Principles of urban planning, China Architecture & Building 
Press, Beijing [in Chinese].  
 
Valadez, JM 2001, Deliberative democracy, political legitimacy, and 
self-determination in multicultural societies, Westview Press, Boulder.  
 
van Kersbergen, K & van Waarden, F 2004, ‘‘Governance’ as a bridge between 
disciplines: cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems 
of governability, accountability and legitimacy’, European Journal of Political 
Research, vol. 43, pp. 143-171. 
 
van Vilet, W 2008, Broad-based partnerships as a strategy for urban livability: an 
evaluation of best practices, UNON Print Shop, Nairobi. 
 
Wang, F 2008, The theory and practice of public participation in environment 
protection. Master thesis, Southwest Jiaotong University [in Chinese].  
 
Warren, ME 2002, ‘What can democratic participation mean today?’, Political Theory, 
vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 677-701.  
 
White, S 1988, The recent work of Jürgen Habermas: reason, justice, and modernity, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.  
 
Wirth, L 1938, ‘urbanism as a way of life’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 44, pp. 
1-24 
 
Wong, J 2010, ‘Better governance, not democracy, as China’s immediate development 
challenge’, East Asian Policy, vol.2, no.4, pp. 29-37.  
 
Wu, FS 2010, The rise of public environmentalism in local China: a comparative 
study of Guangdong and Guangxi. Available from: <www.chinacentre.ox.ac.uk>. [29 
November 2011]. 
 
Yang, PR 2010, Ecological urbanism: scale, flow and design, China Architecture & 
Building Press, Beijing [in Chinese].  
 
Yang, DP (ed.) 2009, The China environment yearbook, volume 3: crises and 
137 
 
opportunities, Brill, London & Boston.  
 
Yiftachel, O 1998, ‘Planning and social control: exploring the dark side’, Journal of 
Planning Literature, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 395-406. 
 
Young, I 2000, Inclusion and democracy, Oxford University Press, New York.  
 
Zhang, XK 2009, ‘Zhong xin guan xi qian jing guang kuo’, Guo ji shang bao 12 
November, p. S01 [in Chinese].  
 
Zhao, QW 2008, The study on participatory approach in environmental governance. 
Master thesis, Xiamen University [in Chinese].  
 
Zhu, DM 2004, ‘Network public governance: cooperation and common-governing’, 
Journal of Central China Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences), vol. 
43, no. 2, pp. 5-13 [in Chinese].  
 
Zhu, JM 2008, ‘China’s developmental planning in rapid urbanization: resource 
mobilization and responsiveness to market change’ in Dialogues in urban and 
regional planning 3, eds TL Harper, AG Yeh & H Coata, Routledge, New York, pp. 
76-105.  
 
Zhu, JM 2009, Building sustainable Asian cities through top-down orders or 
bottom-up initiatives?, lecture notes distributed in EIA seminar at National University 














Appendix – Survey Questions 
 
 
Please kindly fill in the following: 
 
Name/Surname  
Gender  Male   Female 
Age   
Occupation  
Position  
Monthly average income (RMB) 
 ＜1,000   1,000-3,000   3,000-5,000  
 5,000-10,000   ＞10,000 
Location of registered resid nce 
 Gulou District   Baixia District   Xuanwu 
District   Jianye District   Qinhuai District  
 Others__________ 
Educational level 
 ≤6 years   6-9 years   10-12 years 
 13-16 years   ≥16 years 
Any further clarifications  
 
(1) How do you think the awareness people around you have toward environmental protection in 
Nanjing? 
 Very strong   Strong   Moderate   Weak   Very weak 
 
(2) What do you think as the three most important forces in environmental governance? (Please sort 
out three of them in terms of their significance from the following options.) 
       Government   Citizens   Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)   
 Enterprises    Research and educational institutions   Not clear 
 
(3) To what extent do you know the concept of citizen participation in environmental governance? 
       Very well   Well   Somewhat   Not at all 
 
(4) Do you know a hotline, 12369, for environmental protection?         Yes   No 
      
(5) When you happen to know a specific environmental governance activity in Nanjing, will you take 
part in it?                                                                        





(6) Have you ever taken participation in activities about environmental governance in Nanjing before?
       Yes    No   If ‘Yes’, _________ times 
 
(7) Have you taken part in any activities about environmental governance during the last 6 months in 
Nanjing?     Yes    No 
       
(8) What specific contents did you participate in environmental governance in Nanjing? 
       Participated in legislative process  Participated in administrative decision making 
       Participated in supervision and law enforcement  Participated with individual 
behaviors  Others_______________________________________________________ 
 
(9) Which main participative ways did you choose in environmental governance in Nanjing? 
(multiple-choice question) 
       Vote  Public hearing or forum  Environmental impact assessment (EIA) system   
       Survey or interview  Consultation and negotiation  Complaints by letters and visits
       Petition  Litigation  Media supervision  Communication on Internet 
       Participation through schools   Participation through work units, NGOs and etc. 
      Others__________________________________________ 
       
(10) Which abovementioned participative approaches do you think are effective in the environmental 
governance process in Nanjing? 
       _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
(11) What do you think about present citizens’ participatory approaches in Nanjing? 
        Not enough and not easy to get access to    Enough but not easy to get access to 
        Not enough but easy to get access to        Enough and easy to get access to 
 
(12) Did you mainly take participation in environmental governance in Nanjing when environmental 
issues had happened already?  
        Yes    No 
 
(13) Were you directly involved in most environmental governance activities in Nanjing? 
        Yes    No 
 
(14) How did you participate in most environmental governance activities in Nanjing, actively or 
passively? 
        Actively   Sometimes actively while sometimes passively   Passively 
 
(15) Did you mainly participate in environmental governance activities in Nanjing that are related with 
your personal interests?   Yes    No 
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(16) In your opinion, how is the overall effect of citizen participation in environmental governance in 
Nanjing? 
        Effective   A little bit effective   Ineffective 
 
(17) Why do you think the overall effect of citizen participation is effective/a little bit of effective and 
ineffective in environmental governance in Nanjing? What suggestions do you have towards 
present problems in environmental governance in Nanjing? 




























非常强  强  一般  弱  非常弱 
 
(2) 你认为在城市环境治理中最主要的推动方应是以下选项中的哪三项？（请按它们的重要程度排序选择）   
政府  市民  非政府组织（NGOs）  企业  教育研究机构  不清楚 
       
(3) 您在多大程度上了解环境治理中的公众参与这一概念？ 
    非常了解  了解  有些了解  不了解 
 
(4) 您知道 12369 环境保护专用热线吗？ 知道  不知道 
 
(5) 当您恰巧在南京碰上一次具体的环境治理活动，您会参与其中吗？ 会   不会   看情况         
 
(6) 您曾经在南京参与过任何与环境治理、环境保护相关的活动吗？ 
     有   没有   如果“有”，参与过 _________ 次 
 
(7) 在过去的六个月中你曾在南京参与过任何与环境治理相关的活动吗？ 有   没有 
       
(8) 您参加的南京市环境治理活动的具体内容有哪些？（可多选） 




     ○1 公民投票表决 ○2 公开的听证会 ○3 环境影响评价制度 ○4 问卷调查或意见访谈 ○5 专家咨询或听讲座 
姓  
性别 男  女 




＜1,000  1,000-3,000  3,000-5,000  
5,000-10,000  ＞10,000 
户口所在区 
鼓楼区  白下区  玄武区  建邺区  下关区 
秦淮区  其它_________________ 
教育水平 









     ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
     ——————————————————————————————————————————— 
 
(11) 您怎样评价现阶段南京市环境治理中的公众参与方式？ 
      不充足且不能被公众通畅使用   充足但不能被公众通畅使用  
      不充足但能被公众通畅使用      充足且能被公众通畅使用 
 
(12) 您一般是否是在环境问题已经发生之后才参与到环境治理过程之中的呢？ 是   不是 
 
(13) 您一般是否是直接参与到南京市环境治理活动中的呢？ 是   不是 
 
(14) 您一般是主动地还是被动地参与到南京市环境治理活动中的呢？       
主动地  有时主动有时被动  被动地 
 
(15) 您过去是否主要参与与您自身利益相关的南京市环境治理活动？ 是   不是 
 
(16) 总的来说，您觉得现阶段的公众参与对南京市的环境治理有效吗？ 




       ____________________________________________________________________ 
       ____________________________________________________________________ 
       ____________________________________________________________________ 
       ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
